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YOUR URINE OR YOUR JOB: IS PRIVATE EMPLOYEE
DRUG URINALYSIS CONSTITUTIONAL IN
CALIFORNIA?
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, the use of mandatory drug testing of employees by urinal-
ysis has been a prevalent media topic.1 An estimated twenty percent of
Fortune 1000 companies require drug testing of job applicants and/or
current employees who are suspected of drug use,2 while approximately
twenty-five percent of Fortune 500 companies require such testing.3 One
1. See, e.g., Callahan, Putting Baseball to the Test, TIME, May 20, 1985, at 55; Lacayo,
Putting Them All to the Test, TIME, Oct. 21, 1985, at 61; Press, First the Lie Detector, Then the
Chemicals: Is There a Right to Privacy in the Private Sector?, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 27, 1986, at
56; Uelmen, Employee Drug Tests on Collision Course with Privacy, L.A. Herald Examiner,
Mar. 23, 1986, Comment, at F-i, col. 5; Omestad, Drug Tests at 3M Plant Yield Constitutional
Debate, L.A. Times, Feb. 23, 1986, pt. II, at 6, col. 1 (valley ed.); Westin, Drug Testing vs
Employee Privacy: Long Struggle for Fairness Lies Ahead, L.A. Times, Feb. 10, 1986, pt. II, at
5, col. 1; Davis Urges Added Help in Drug Fight, Daily News, Jan. 31, 1986, Sports, at 1, col. I;
Stein, S.F. Votes to Ban Random Drug Tests in Workplace, L.A. Times, Nov. 19, 1985, pt. I, at
3, col. 1; Matier, S.F. Bans Random Drug Tests, S.F. Examiner, Nov. 13, 1985, at A-1, col. 4;
Hinckle, Sweat Isn't Enough-Boss Demands a Sample in a Bottle Too, S.F. Examiner, Nov.
11, 1985, at A-1, col. 1; Gurnick, Dodgers Put Drug Clause in Yeager's New Contract, L.A.
Herald Examiner, Nov. 10, 1985, Sports, at D-4, col. 2; Matier, Fight for Workers' Privacy,
S.F. Examiner, Sept. 29, 1985, at B-I, col. 4; Goldman, Ueberroth Wants Players Drug Tested,
L.A. Times, Sept. 25, 1985, pt. III, at 1, col. 6; Ueberroth Calls for Voluntary Drug Testing,
L.A. Herald Examiner, Sept. 25, 1985, Sports, at D-1, col. 1; The Many Tests for Drug Abuse,
N.Y. Times, Feb. 24, 1985, § III, at F-17, col. 2; Harris, Military's Faulty Drug-Testing Pro-
gram Wrongly Punishes Thousands, L.A. Times, Sept. 16, 1984, pt. I, at 3, col. 1.
2. Omestad, Drug Tests at 3M Plant Yield Constitutional Debate, L.A. Times, Feb. 23,
1986, pt. II, at 6, col. I (valley ed.) (statistic taken from a 1985 survey).
Among the better known employers conducting drug tests by urinalysis are International
Business Machines (IBM), which initiated a program to test for drug use among applicants at
all levels, The Many Tests for Drug Abuse, N.Y. Times, Feb. 24, 1985, § III, at F-17, col. 2,
General Motors Corp. and Ford Motor Co., Stille, Drug Testing: The Scene is Set For a Dra-
matic Legal Collision Between the Rights of Employers and Workers, Nat'l L.J., Apr. 7, 1986,
at 23, col. 3. A widely publicized mandatory drug urinalysis program involves major league
baseball. The Commissioner of Baseball, Peter Ueberroth, was said to be "cracking down on
the bat boys, secretaries, office clerks, scouts, managers ... owners-and commissioners."
Callahan, Putting Baseball to the Test, TIME, May 20, 1985, at 55, col. 1. Ueberroth has also
asked all major league players, whose collective bargaining agreement precludes random test-
ing, to voluntarily submit to unannounced drug tests. Goldman, Ueberroth Wants Players
Drug Tested, L.A. Times, Sept. 25, 1985, pt. III, at 1, col. 6. The issue of testing players has
appeared in the sports section of major papers on a regular basis. See, e.g., Guruick, Dodgers
Put Drug Clause in Yeager's New Contract, L.A. Herald Examiner, Nov. 10, 1985, Sports, at
D-4, col. 2; Ueberroth Calls for Voluntary Drug Testing, L.A. Herald Examiner, Sept. 25, 1985,
Sports, at D-1, col. 1.
3. Lacayo, Putting Them All to the Test, TIME, Oct. 21, 1985, at 61.
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need not be a lawyer or legal scholar to understand the arguments re-
ported in newspapers, magazines and on television.4 Supporters of em-
ployee drug testing argue that the tests will help eliminate the serious
drug problems affecting employment and society in general.' Critics con-
tend that testing violates the employee's right to privacy,6 tests are inac-
curate7 and cannot distinguish between drugs recently ingested and
4. Recently, however, employee drug testing has received serious attention from legal
writers. For example, the April 1986 issue of Student Lawyer included an extensive article
regarding employee drug testing touching on many issues discussed in this Comment. En-
glade, Who's Hired and Who's Fired, STUDENT LAWYER, Apr. 1986, at 20. The article ex-
tends the discussion to the legal implications involved in "genetic screening." Id. at 27. The
article states that
[o]ne of the more troubling aspects of the sudden proliferation of urine testing across
the country is the prospect that drug screening may be only the tip of the ice-
berg. . . . [U]rinalysis may be just the beginning of a new generation of government
and industry-sponsored exams designed to predict everything from the likelihood an
individual will develop an ulcer to the possibility he or she will come down with
cancer.
Id. at 26.
Similarly, The National Law Journal's April 7, 1986 lengthy cover story addressed the
"dramatic collision between the rights of employers and workers." Stille, Drug Testing: The
Scene is Set For a Dramatic Legal Collision Between the Rights of Employers and Workers,
Nat'l L.J., Apr. 7, 1986, at 1, col. 1. The article notes that critics cite instances of testing abuse
and challenge both the reliability and constitutionality of the tests. Critics predict that such
testing will "ruin the careers of tens of thousands of innocent people and trample the civil
liberties of millions more." Id. at 1, col. 2.
5. See, e.g., Lacayo, supra note 3, at 61 ("Supporters of testing in general argue that it is
justified by pressing requirements of public health and safety."); Westin, Drug Testing vs. Em-
ployee Privacy. Long Struggle for Fairness Lies Ahead, L.A. Times, Feb. 10, 1986, pt. II, at 5,
col. 1 ("Employers say that they face rising levels of accidents and impaired performance from
millions of employees-and executives-whose on-the-job behavior is affected by drug and
alcohol abuse."); Stein, S.F Votes to Ban Random Drug Tests in Workplace, L.A. Times, Nov.
19, 1985, pt. I, at 3, col. 4 (San Francisco ordinance banning random drug testing is "disgrace-
ful" because it appears to condone drug use (citing Quentin Kopp, San Francisco Supervisor));
Press, First the Lie Detector, Then the Chemicals: Is there a Right to Privacy in the Private
Sector?, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 27, 1986, at 56 ("How can employers guarantee a safe and secure
operation and at the same time not infringe on the privacy rights of their (for the most part)
innocent workers? The problem is real; drug use has spread to every occupation."); Goldman,
supra note 2, at 1, col. 6 (" 'Baseball's reputation is at stake and it is our responsibility. . . to
stop this menace before more damage is done. . . .'" (quoting Peter Ueberroth)).
6. See, e.g., Omestad, supra note 2, at 6, col. I ("Critics contend that the [drug testing
program at 3M] violates privacy rights granted in the California Constitution. .. ."); Westin,
supra note 5, at 5, col. 1 ("[T]hese tests measure the lingering presence of substances that
employees usually have consumed in their private lives, not on the job."); Matier, S.F. Bans
Random Drug Tests, S. F. Examiner, Nov. 13, 1985, at A-1, col. 4, A-18, col. 3 (The purpose
of San Francisco's newly enacted municipal code banning random employee drug testing was
"'to ensure workers a certain amount of dignity and personal privacy.'" (quoting Bill Maher,
San Francisco Supervisor)).
7. See, e.g., Stein, supra note 5, at 18, col. 3 ("Opponents of the tests. . . note that it is
not uncommon for the tests to record 'false positives'--that is, to detect a trace of, perhaps,
herbal tea and identify it as marijuana." See infra notes 46-54 and accompanying text. Oppo-
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drugs ingested weeks before.8
The intrusiveness of the tests becomes clear to some only when con-
fronted by a specimen bottle and a demand for urine. This was exempli-
fied by the reaction of Rodney Smith, deputy executive director of the
President's Commission on Organized Crime, when he was told to give a
urine sample before he would be allowed to testify before the House Post
Office and Civil Service Human Resources Subcommittee about making
such tests mandatory for all federal workers. Mr. Smith was told that
"[t]he chair will require you to go to the men's room under the direct
observation of a male member of the subcommittee staff to urinate in this
specimen bottle."9 Mr. Smith angrily complained that the subcommittee
embarrassed him and did not warn him. He was then reminded that the
presidential commission's proposal would similarly not provide warning
to federal workers.1"
On an intuitive level, it makes sense to do everything possible to end
drug abuse in our society. However, both the United States Constitution
and the California Constitution limit what can be done to accomplish
this end. Society cannot do "everything possible" to end drug use," any
nents also note that "people who have not used drugs have been wrongly red-flagged by tests
because they had been in the same room as someone using marijuana."); Press, supra note 5, at
57 ("[Cjritics have doubts about efficacy: the Journal of the American Medical Association
reported last year that labs with government contracts were wrong as much as 100 percent of
the time when testing urine specimens for drug traces."); Lacayo, supra note 3, at 61 (Critics
say that the Emit Test, see infra notes 24-64 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
Emit Test, is far less reliable than the 97%-99% accuracy which the manufacturer claims.
This is "in part because samples are not always properly stored or handled by lab personnel.");
The Many Tests for Drug Abuse, supra note 2, at F-17, col. 3 ("The test's manufacturer...
claims [Emit] has a 95 percent accuracy rate, but many doctors disagree. 'False positives can
range up to 25 percent or higher,' insisted Dr. David Greenblatt, chief of clinical pharmacol-
ogy at Tufts New England Medical Center. 'The test is essentially worthless.' ").
8. See, e.g., Lacayo, supra note 3, at 61 (fact that urinalysis can indicate drug use a week
or more after it has taken place indicates the test's inappropriateness, because "how people
spend their time away from work is a private matter" (quoting Alan Westin, Columbia Univer-
sity professor)); The Many Tests for Drug Abuse, supra note 2, at F-17, col. 3 (Legal experts
contend that drug tests are "an unconstitutional attempt on the part of corporations to control
employees' behavior at home-particularly since they can yield positive results days and even
weeks after drug use."); Uelmen, Employee Drug Tests on Collision Course with Privacy, L.A.
Herald Examiner, Mar. 23, 1986, Comment, at F-1, col. 5 (Marijuana can be detected as long
as 30 days after use).
9. Drug Test Advocate Refuses to Be Tested, L.A. Times, Mar. 19, 1986, pt. I, at 10, col.
1.
10. Id. at 10, col. 1-2 (citing statement by Chairman Gary L. Ackerman).
11. In a recent district court case that dealt with urinalysis of government employees, the
court discussed the limitations on government as follows:
No doubt most employers consider it undesirable for employees to use drugs, and
would like to be able to identify any who use drugs. Taking and testing body fluid
specimens. . . would help the employer discover drug use and other useful informa-
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more than it can do "everything possible" to end crime. For example,
the government could not authorize random searches of individuals'
homes even though such searches would occasionally yield weapons or
drugs. The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution protects
individuals from unreasonable intrusion by government.12 The California
Constitution extends this protection by limiting intrusion by anyone, in-
cluding business interests,13 to circumstances where there is a compelling
public interest.' 4 A California Supreme Court case which discussed Cali-
fornia's constitutional right to privacy stated "that 'both the United
States Constitution and the California Constitution make it emphatically
clear that important as efficient law enforcement may be, it is more im-
portant that the right to privacy guaranteed by these constitutional pro-
visions be respected.' ,is Recently, a proposed bill which would have
subjected virtually every private employee in California to yearly random
testing was denounced at a "hostile Senate hearing" as "unnecessary,
'unconstitutional and un-American.'"' 6 The proposal was ultimately
dropped by its author, Senator John Seymour. 7
This Comment will interpret the limits that California's explicit con-
stitutional right to privacy places on a private employer who demands a
urine test from an employee. There is federal case law that identifies an
tion about employees. There is no doubt about it-searches and seizures can yield a
wealth of information useful to the searcher. (That is why King George III's men so
frequently searched the colonists.) That potential, however, does not make a govern-
mental employer's search of an employee a constitutionally reasonable one.
McDonell v. Hunter, 612 F. Supp. 1122, 1130 (S.D. Iowa 1985).
12. The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution, see infra note 76, on its face
limits the ability of government to prevent crime. The probable cause requirement explicitly
limits the government's ability to search a person even to prevent a crime. For example, in
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 648 (1979), a policeman found marijuana in a driver's car.
If government could do anything possible to prevent crime, this evidence could have been used
against the defendant. However, because the officer did not have a valid reason to stop the
defendant, such as a traffic violation or other suspicious activity, the evidence was suppressed.
Id.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 230-44.
14. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1. See White v. Davis, 13 Cal. 3d 757, 775, 533 P.2d 222, 234,
120 Cal. Rptr. 94, 106 (1975) (quoting CALIFORNIA SECRETARY OF STATE, PROPOSED
AmENDMENTS TO CONSTITUTION 26 (Nov. 7, 1972)). See infra notes 194-95 and accompany-
ing text discussing White.
15. People v. Triggs, 8 Cal. 3d 884, 892, 506 P.2d 232, 237, 106 Cal. Rptr. 408, 413 (1973)
(quoting People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 438-39, 282 P.2d 905, 907 (1955)), disapproved on
other grounds, People v. Lilienthal, 22 Cal. 3d 891, 587 P.2d 706, 150 Cal. Rptr. 910 (1978).
The Triggs court held that CAL. CONST. art. I, § I protected the defendants' reasonable expec-
tation of privacy when using doorless public restrooms. Id.
16. Bunting, Workers' Drug-Testing Bill Stirs Ruckus, Gets Shelved, L.A. Times, Apr. 10,




employee's right to be free from unreasonable drug testing by govern-
ment as protected by the fourth amendment.18 These federal cases are
utilized to develop a method to determine the reasonableness and consti-
tutionality under the California Constitution of a private employer re-
quiring mandatory employee drug urinalysis.
The proposed method will discuss the "reasonableness" of employee
drug testing by addressing the limits of employers' "legitimate concern,"
and whether such tests properly address this concern. Urinalysis may
not be appropriate because the tests do not indicate intoxication at the
time of testing 9 and are known to be inaccurate.20 If an employee's ac-
tivities during his or her own free time are not a legitimate concern of
business, then utilizing a test that cannot prove impairment at work is an
unreasonable invasion of privacy.2 A substantial amount of case law
and other authority dealing with drugs and the workplace indicate that
employees should be terminated or disciplined only if drug use affects
their job.2 2 As one commentator put it, there is a "well-accepted princi-
ple that what employees do on their own time and off the employer's
premises are generally not the employer's concern.
2 3
II. THE URINE TEST COMMONLY USED TO DETECT EMPLOYEE
DRUG USE
In 1980, the Syva Company of Palo Alto, California (Syva) intro-
duced an inexpensive test to detect traces of marijuana in urine.24 The
Emit Cannabinoid Assay (Emit Test)25 greatly simplified and lowered
the cost of urinalysis drug testing.26 This inexpensive, easily adminis-
tered test makes large scale testing practical and convenient in many con-
18. See infra notes 79-190 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 39-45 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 46-57 and accompanying text.
21. See infra text accompanying note 45. For a complete discussion of urinalysis' inability
to prove intoxication at the time of testing, see supra notes 29-45 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 260-81 and accompanying text.
23. Susser, Legal Issues Raised by Drugs in the Workplace, 36 LAB. L.J. 42, 46 (citing
Bornstein, Drug and Alcohol Issues in the Workplace: An Arbitrator's Perspective, 39 ARB. J.
23 (1984)).
24. Zeese, Mariuana Urinalysis Tests, 1 DRUG L. REP. 25 (1983).
25. See SYVA COMPANY, MARIJUANA AND THE EMIT CANNABINOID ASSAY (June 1981)
[hereinafter cited as SYvA REPORT].
26. Tests developed prior to Emit require a greater degree of technical sophistication than
Emit, and are more expensive and less convenient to use on a large scale. R. Hawks, Develop-
ments in Cannabinoid Analyses of Body Fluids: Implications for Forensic Applications 3
(Aug. 1982) (unpublished manuscript) (presented at Cannabinoids 82, Louisville, Ky.) (avail-
able at Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review office).
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texts,27 including employment. Commercial introduction of the Emit
Test sparked the emerging emphasis on drug testing in employment.28
A. The Emit Test
A primary feature of the portable Emit Test is that non-technical
personnel may perform the test without the need for laboratory analy-
sis.2 9 Emit Test results are available within minutes of testing,30 and un-
like other methods of testing, 31 Emit does not require specialized
instruments or highly trained operators.32
The test must identify a certain amount of tetrahydrocannabinal
(THC)33 metabolites 34 in the urine to show a positive result.3" Syva re-
ported that although the Emit Test does not determine the concentration
of THC in one's body, a positive result is a strong indication that the
individual has been exposed36 to cannabinoids.3 7 A Syva report indi-
cated that the Emit Test was ninety-five percent accurate in a controlled
setting.38 Metabolites can be detected in the urine long after the impair-
27. In addition to employment, wide scale urinalysis drug testing is used in prisons and
schools. Zeese, supra note 24, at 25. Massive drug testing has also been instituted in the
military. Harris, Military's Faulty Drug-Testing Program Wrongly Punishes Thousands, L.A.
Times, Sept. 16, 1984, pt. I, at 3, col. 1. Pentagon officials estimated that as of 1984, more than
six million urinalyses had been utilized in the military to detect the presence of drugs. Id. at 3,
col. 2.
28. Zeese, supra note 24, at 1.
29. Id. at 6, 25.
30. SYvA REPORT, supra note 25, at 5.
31. For a discussion of other methods of drug testing by urinalysis, see Hawks, supra note
26, at 3; Zeese, supra note 24, at 27.
32. SYvA REPORT, supra note 25, at 5.
33. THC is the psychoactive component that produces the "high" associated with mari-
juana. Id. at I.
34. After the marijuana is in the body, the liver converts (metabolizes) THC into different
chemical elements called "metabolites." Of the total amount of marijuana taken into the body,
approximately 99% of THC is converted to and excreted as metabolites. About one percent of
THC is excreted as unchanged drug. Id.
35. Id. at 5. A description of the actual amounts of THC metabolites required to indicate
a positive test is beyond the scope of this Comment. For further discussion, see id.
36. "Exposure" to marijuana may mean that an individual passively inhaled marijuana
smoke while in the company of others actually smoking the substance.
For example, a 1977 study reported in the American Journal of Psychiatry indicated that a
control person who did not smoke marijuana, when put in a room with marijuana smokers,
tested at a rate significantly higher than the common cut-off point for urinalysis. Zeese, supra
note 24, at 28.
37. SYVA REPORT, supra note 25, at 6.
38. Ann Burton, technical consultant in Syva's technical service department, said that
Syva's quality controlled tests show an accuracy rate of 97%-99%. Telephone interview with
Ann Burton, Syva Co. (Nov. 15, 1985). Presumably, great care is consistently taken in this
ment, or the "high," from the marijuana has ceased.3 9 Syva clearly
warns that the Emit Test does not determine a correlation between the
degree of psychoactive effect (the actual "high") and the concentration of
metabolites in the urine.4°
One reason that it is impossible to correlate the amount of metabo-
lites excreted with actual intoxication is that individual factors affect the
amount of THC metabolites excreted in urine.4 ' For example, THC has
been shown to convert to metabolites faster in chronic users than in in-
frequent users.42 Syva notes that factors such as body weight, stress,
menstrual cycle, diet and other physical and psychological factors may
cause erratic increases or decreases in the excretion rate in individuals.43
Therefore, the number of metabolites present in urine may be the same in
a person who smoked marijuana just prior to testing and a person who
smoked days or weeks earlier, depending upon one's metabolic rate. In
other words, an individual with a certain number of metabolites may still
be adversely affected by marijuana, while a second person with the same
quality controlled environment. Such care is not necessarily taken with actual use. See supra
notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
See also The Many Tests for Drug Abuse, supra note 2, at F-17, col. 3, which noted that
Syva claims a 95% accuracy rate, but that "many doctors disagree." Dr. David Greenblatt,
Chief of Clinical Pharmacology at Tufts New England Medical Center, stated that "[flalse
positives can range up to 25 percent or higher" and that "[t]he test is essentially worthless."
Id.
39. After 72 hours of marijuana intake, about 40%-50% of the THC in the initial dose is
converted to metabolites and is excreted in feces and urine. It is believed that the remaining
50%-60% of the THC is distributed throughout the body and stored by various fatty tissues.
The THC will find its way into the bloodstream over an estimated 7 to 36 days and eventually
will convert to metabolites and will be excreted. SYvA REPORT, supra note 25, at 2; see Zeese,
supra note 24, at 26 (citation omitted). One study indicated that six chronic marijuana users,
after supervised abstinence, showed a "positive" test result for marijuana. Id. This fact does
not indicate that the users were "high" for 36 days, but merely that the THC metabolites
which indicate recent drug use were excreted for that period. Id.
The maximum psychoactive effect after smoking marijuana is estimated to occur within
20 to 30 minutes after smoking and lasts for about 90 to 120 minutes. The maximum
psychoactive effect after eating marijuana is estimated to occur within two to three hours.
SYvA REPORT, supra note 25, at 1.
40. Id. at 2. Ann Burton, technical consultant in Syva's technical service department,
confirmed that the information in the early (1980-1981) Drugs ofAbuse Series put out by Syva
is still accurate today. She specifically confirmed that the urine tests do not and are not ex-
pected to measure intoxication at the time of testing. Instead, the test determines whether the
person tested "recently" used the drug. Telephone interview with Ann Burton, Syva Co.
(Nov. 15, 1985).
41. SYVA REPORT, supra note 25, at 3.
42. Id.
43. Id.
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number of metabolites has long been unaffected. 44 The Syva report con-
cludes that the assay of THC metabolites in urine is "useful only as an




A major concern regarding the accuracy of urinalysis drug testing is
what is commonly called "false positives." A false positive is a positive
test result which occurs even though the person tested has never used the
drug. Estimates of false positives in urine testing range from one percent,
44. The Syva Company lists six factors that may affect the amount of THC metabolites
that are excreted in urine:
1. [ ]THC has been shown to be metabolized (converted to metabolites) more rapidly in
chronic (frequent) users than in infrequent users.
2. In controlled smoking studies, frequent users of marijuana often show initial levels (in
blood as well as in urine) of THC metabolites that are greater than the highest levels
obtained by relatively infrequent users.
3. Absorption and distribution of [ ]THC throughout the body is different for each per-
son. Thus, the rate of conversion to metabolites (and the subsequent excretion of
these metabolites) of the [ ]THC that is stored in fatty tissue will vary for different
individuals. It is not yet known whether factors such as body weight, stress, the
menstrual cycle, diet or other physical or psychological influences can cause erratic
increases and decreases in the excretion rate in any given individual.
4. [ ]The method of administration (smoking or eating) does not appear to affect excre-
tion of metabolites.
5. The volume of urine differs throughout the day for any individual. When the total
volume is greater, for instance as a result of drinking large quantities of liquid, the
concentration of a given component can become diluted. Thus, assuming that the
same amount of [ ]THC metabolites are present in the urine of two different individu-
als, the person with the greatest total volume of urine will exhibit an apparently lower
concentration of metabolites. Conversely, if an individual has retained urine for an
extended period of time, for instance, during sleep, the urine concentration of the
various components may be higher in a sample taken from the first urination in the
morning than a sample taken from a urination later in the day. This fact may also
affect the apparent concentration of [ ]THC metabolites in random urine collections
over a 24-hour day.
6. The kidney functions as one of the body's "filters." It removes waste from body fluids
and deposits the waste in the urine for excretion. When the kidney's ability to filter is
impaired (by disease, for instance), the wastes are not removed as promptly as they
would be in healthy individuals. . . . [A]n individual may exhibit an erratic urinary
excretion pattern of a given waste product such as [ ]THC metabolites, for example.
SYVA REPORT, supra note 25, at 3-4 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
45. Id. at 4. There is no method of urinalysis available to determine actual intoxication at
the time of testing and none is expected. Telephone interview with Ann Burton, Technical
Serv. Dep't, Syva Co. (Nov. 15, 1985). There is evidence that blood or plasma samples may be
better indicators of actual intoxication at the time of testing. Hawks, supra note 26, at 5; see
also Zeese, supra note 24, at 28 (citation omitted).
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claimed by Syva, to one hundred percent, claimed by others.4 6
One way that a false positive is said to occur is through passive in-
halation of marijuana by a non-smoker. 7 This passive inhalation results
in a positive test.48 Another type of false positive occurs when the test
detects substances that the human body naturally produces and mistak-
enly interprets those substances as drugs. For example, the Emit Test
may detect a liver enzyme, malate dehydrogenase, which can be created
by conditions including kidney tumors, kidney trauma or infection, liver
disorders or bladder infections. This enzyme may cause a positive test
result.49 Similarly, according to a chemist who frequently testifies in
drug abuse cases, a pigment in dark-skinned people breaks down into
chemical fragments similar to those in marijuana and can lead to wrong-
ful accusations of marijuana use based on inaccurate urine tests.
50 Still
another means of creating a false positive is through "cross-reactivity."
Cross-reactivity means that substances ingested, other than the drug
tested for, will show up as if they were that drug.5 Among the sub-
stances suspected of creating cross-reactivity with the Emit Test is aspi-
rin.52 Common, non-medicinal substances may also create cross-
reactivity. For example, the urine test of two military medical interns
showed positive for morphine. It turned out that the "positive" result
was created by poppyseeds from the bagels they had eaten in the hospital
cafeteria.5  Herbal tea has also been found to create false positives.
54
2. Improper handling
Another threat to the accuracy of a urinalysis drug test is the prob-
lem of mishandling and misdiagnosing the tests. With the relatively sim-
ple urine tests such as Emit, which can be and are used on a massive
scale, the ease of the test itself causes problems. The use of non-technical
personnel to administer the test sometimes encourages improper test-
46. See Press, supra note 5, at 57; see generally supra note 7 and accompanying text.
47. See supra note 36.
48. Id.
49. Zeese, supra note 24, at 28 (citing S. CLARK, J. TURNER & R. BASTIANI, SYVA CO.;
EMIT CANNABINOID ASSAY: CLINICAL STUDY No. 74 SUMMARY REPORT (1980) (Mr. Zeese
based his conclusion on this Clinical Study)).
50. Tests for MarUuana Flawed, Chemist Says, L.A. Times, Apr. 9, 1986, pt. I, at 5, col. 1.
51. Zeese, supra note 24, at 26.
52. Id. Substances which are said to create false-positives include: aspirin, amphetamine,
amitriptyline, benzoeyclecgonine, diazepam, meperdine, methaqualone, morphine,
phencyclidine, proposyphene and secobarbital. Id. (citing S. CLARK, J. TURNER & R. BAS-
TIANI, supra note 49, at 22-24).
53. Harris, supra note 27, at 3, col. 2.
54. Stein, supra note 5, at 18, col. 3.
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ing 5 5 One expert stated that "[n]o method, regardless of how simple,
can substitute for technical experience when an analysis carries signifi-
cant consequences for the individual being tested."1
5 6
Even in situations where urine is tested by qualified laboratories,
there is a tremendous potential for error. In the military, where the ma-
jority of past urinalysis drug testing has been conducted, an estimated
60,000 to 70,000 people were given the right to appeal disciplinary ac-
tions because there were documentation problems at the laboratories that
analyzed their drug tests.57
3. Confirmation
The manufacturer of the Emit Test itself stated that "confirmation
...of any positive [test] result is essential."5" It recommends that a
positive result be confirmed by a method other than the Emit Test 9
The need for confirmation of a positive Emit result was recognized
and discussed in Storms v. Coughlin,6" a federal case regarding the consti-
tutionality of urinalysis of prison inmates. The court accepted a state
trial court's finding that medical evidence did not show that the Emit
Test had been generally accepted by experts as producing a reliable posi-
tive result "in the absence of independent confirmation."6 The state
court had enjoined use of Emit Test results in prison disciplinary hear-
ings " 'unless accompanied by evidence that the positive result was con-
firmed by an alternate method of analysis.' ,62 The Storms court also
quoted a Syva release which stated, "'[b]ecause there are many variables
that affect ordinary drug levels,... [r]esults should be confirmed by...
an alternative equally sensitive analytical method when loss of rights or
other corrective action is contemplated.' "63
The Storms court found that merely having a second officer adminis-
55. Hawks, supra note 26, at 6.
56. Id. Similarly, when Syva discussed its test's 95%-99% accuracy rate, it emphasized
that results were based on administration in a quality controlled environment. See supra note
38.
57. Harris, supra note 27, at 3, col. 3.
58. SYVA REPORT, supra note 25, at 17.
59. A primary characteristic of a confirmation test should be that it is a non-immunologi-
cal method; the Emit Test is an immunological method. Zeese, supra note 24, at 27. Explain-
ing these confirmation techniques in more detail is beyond the scope of this Comment. For
further explanation, see id.
60. 600 F. Supp. 1214 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). See infra notes 88-95 and accompanying text for
further discussion of Storms.
61. Storms, 600 F. Supp. at 1221 (citing Kane v. Fair, No. 136229, slip op. at 4 (Super. Ct.
Mass. Aug. 5, 1983)) (emphasis in original).
62. Id. (quoting Kane v. Fair, No. 136229, slip op. at 9 (Super. Ct. Mass. Aug. 5, 1983)).
63. Id. at 1222 (quoting an affidavit of an expert with a doctorate in biophysics).
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ter a second Emit Test to an inmate who tested positive in a previous
Emit Test was not a sufficient protection. The court stated that "[w]hile
this precaution will correct for human error in the testing process, it will
not affect machine-generated error. Only testing by a different method
can do that."'
III. EXISTING LAW REGARDING DRUG TESTING IN EMPLOYMENT
A. California
California currently has no case or statutory law regarding urinal-
ysis of employees. 6 There is a proposed amendment to the Labor Code
pending in the California Assembly that would regulate employment
drug testing. 66 Assembly Bill 1482 would put limited restraints on em-
ployers who use medical testing to detect employee drug use. The propo-
sal includes a requirement that employers inform all employees and job
applicants of the company's drug testing policy and that employees must
receive advance notice that such testing may be a routine part of his or
her employment. In addition, employees would have the right to choose
the doctor or laboratory which would administer the test, and any test
would have to be administered within forty-eight hours of the employer's
request.67
San Francisco recently amended its Municipal Code to prohibit em-
64. Id. at 1225 (emphasis added).
65. A Legislative Counsel's Digest comment on a proposed Assembly Bill which would
limit drug testing by urinalysis in the workplace begins with the statement, "[e]xisting law does
not specifically regulate the medical testing of employees to detect the presence of drugs." Cal.
A.B. No. 1482, 1985-86 Reg. Sess. (1985). This assembly bill was introduced by Assembly
Member Klehs.
66. Cal. A.B. 1482 was introduced March 6, 1985, and amended June 13, 1985 by Assem-
bly Member Klehs. See infra note 67.
67. The proposal reads as follows:
SECTION 1. Section 432.4 is added to the Labor Code, to read:
432.4.(a) Every private employer shall inform all employees and applicants for
employment of the employer's policy regarding drug use and medical testing of em-
ployees to detect the presence of drugs.
(b) Every employee shall receive advance notice that medical testing to detect
the presence of drugs may be a routine part of his or her employment before the
employer may require medical testing of employees to detect the presence of drugs.
(c) Each employee has the right to choose his or her own physician, laboratory,
clinic, or hospital to administer medical tests to detect the presence of drugs. The
costs of the testing are the responsibility of the employer.
(d) The medical tests to detect the presence of drugs shall be administered
within 48 hours after the employer requests an employee to take the tests.
(e) Any employer who violates this section is guilty of a misdemeanor punish-
able by a fine of five hundred dollars ($500).
SEC. 2. No reimbursement is required by this act pursuant to Section 6 of Article
XIII B of the California Constitution because the only costs which may be incurred
by a local agency or school district will be incurred because this act creates a new
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ployer drug testing of employees. 68 This ordinance, the first of its kind in
the country,69 is based on California's constitutional right to privacy.70
Drafted by Supervisor Bill Maher, 7I this ordinance passed by a 9-1 vote
of the San Francisco Board of Supervisors.72 Supervisor Maher stated
that the "'whole purpose of the law is to ensure workers a certain
amount of dignity and personal privacy.' ",7
A bill was recently proposed and immediately "shelved," which if
passed would have subjected most workers in California to random drug
testing and would have pre-empted San Francisco's ordinance.74  The
author of the bill, Senator John Seymour, ultimately dropped the propo-
crime or infraction, changes the definition of a crime or infraction, changes the pen-
alty for a crime or infraction, or eliminates a crime or infraction.
Cal. A.B. No. 1482, 1985-86 Reg. Sess. (1985).
68. The amendment states, in pertinent part:
Sec. 3300A. I POLICY. It is the public policy of the City and County of San Fran-
cisco that all citizens enjoy the full benefit of the right to privacy in the workplace
guaranteed to them by Article 1, Section I of the California Constitution. It is the
purpose of this Article to protect employees against unreasonable inquiry and investi-
gation into off-the-job conduct, associations, and activities not directly related to the
actual performance of job responsibilities.
Sec. 3300A.5 EMPLOYER PROHIBITED FROM TESTING OF EMPLOYEES.
No employer may demand, require, or request employees to submit to, to take or to
undergo any blood, urine, or encephalographic test in the body as a condition of
continued employment. Nothing herein shall prohibit an employer from requiring a
specific employee to submit to blood or urine testing if:
(a) the employer has reasonable grounds to believe that an employee's faculties are
impaired on the job; and
(b) the employee is in a position where such impairment presents a clear and present
danger to the physical safety of the employee, another employee or to a member of
the public; and
(c) the employer provides the employee, at the employer's expense, the opportunity
to have the sample tested or evaluated by [a] State licensed independent laboratory/
testing facility and provides the employee with a reasonable opportunity to rebut or
explain the results.
SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., POLICE CODE ch. 8, art. 33A (1985).
Additionally the amendment states that in conducting those tests designed to identify the
presence of chemical substances in the body, the employer shall ensure to the extent feasible
that the test only measure, and that its records only show or make use of, information regard-
ing chemical substances in the body which are likely to affect the employee's ability to safely
perform his or her duties while on the job. Id.
Under no circumstances may employers request, require or conduct random or company-
wide blood, urine or encephalographic testing. Id.
69. Matier, Fight for Workers'Privacy, S.F. Examiner, Sept. 29, 1985, at B-l, col. 4.
70. SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., POLICE CODE ch. 8, art. 33A, § 3300A. 1 (1985); see supra note
68.
71. Matier, supra note 6, at A-l, col. 2.
72. Id.
73. Id. at A-1, col. 3, A-18, col. 3 (quoting Supervisor Maher).
74. Bunting, Workers' Drug-Testing Bill Stirs Ruckus, Gets Shelved, L.A. Times, Apr. 10,
1986, pt. I, at 28, col. 3 & 4.
1462
URINAL YSIS
sal, "ending a hostile Senate hearing during which the measure was de-
nounced as unneccessary, 'unconstitutional and un-American.""'
B. Federal Law on Drug Testing of Employees: Search
and Seizure Analysis
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution is the
starting point for analyzing cases that deal with drug testing of govern-
ment employees. Fourth amendment standards determine whether test-
ing is constitutional in a given situation.7 6 The law is well settled that the
fourth amendment protects people from unreasonable searches of the
person and those things in which he or she has a reasonable expectation
of privacy.77 Whether the individual's expectation of privacy and the
state's intrusion are reasonable is determined by balancing the public in-
terest against the individual's interest.7"
1. Is urinalysis testing a search: What constitutes a reasonable
expectation of privacy?
a. Schmerber v. California
A United States Supreme Court case, Schmerber v. California,79 was
the forerunner of current law which labels urinalysis a search and
seizure. The Schmerber Court noted that the purpose of the fourth
amendment was to "protect personal privacy and dignity against unwar-
ranted intrusion by the State."8" Schmerber was the first Supreme Court
case dealing with state intrusion into the human body."1 The Schmerber
Court held that a blood sample taken from a defendant to determine
intoxication was a search under the fourth amendment.82 The Court
75. Id. at 28, col. 3.
76. The fourth amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
77. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 147 (1925).
78. Division 241 Amalgamated Transit Union v. Suscy, 538 F.2d 1264, 1267 (7th Cir.)
(citing United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 561 (1976); Camara v. Municipal
Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534-35 (1967)), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1029 (1976).
79. 384 U.S. 757 (1966). In Schmerber, a policeman smelled liquor on the defendant's
breath and noticed other symptoms of intoxication. After placing the defendant under arrest,
the policeman directed a doctor to take a blood sample despite the defendant's refusal to con-
sent to the test upon the advice of counsel. Id.
80. Id. at 767.
81. Id. at 767-68.
82. Id. at 767. The Court found that the compulsory administration of blood tests did not
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emphasized the fourth amendment language that individuals have a right
to be secure in their "persons,"83 and held that such testing clearly con-
stituted a search within the meaning of the fourth amendment.84 The
Court further stated that with regard to "searches involving intrusions
beyond the body's surface," a "clear indication that in fact [the incrimi-
nating] evidence will be found"85 is required. The Court realized that the
"clear indication" standard brought with it the risk that the evidence
sought might ultimately be lost.86 The reason there is a risk of total loss
is that alcohol ingested, the evidence sought in Schmerber, quickly leaves
the body and can no longer be detected. Without a "clear indication"
that the alcohol will be found, no test may be administered and any evi-
dence available will be lost.
In analyzing the reasonableness of the warrantless blood test, the
Schmerber Court considered the following factors:
(1) the level of likelihood that intoxication would be found;
(2) the exigency created by the metabolism of blood alcohol;
(3) the reliability of the test performed;
(4) the response of the person tested to the process of blood extrac-
tion; and
(5) the manner of blood extraction.87
b. applying Schmerber to urinalysis cases
i. is there a reasonable expectation of privacy?
In Storms v. Coughlin 88 a federal district court applied the Schmer-
ber rationale to determine whether random drug urinalysis of New York
State prison inmates was constitutional. The Storms court recognized
Schmerber's characterization of blood extraction as generally involving
"virtually no risk, trauma, or pain."89 Storms also noted that Schmerber
implicate the fifth amendment because the evidence obtained was non-testimonial. Id. How-
ever, a blood test "plainly involves the broadly conceived reach of a search and seizure under
the Fourth Amendment." Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 769-70 (emphasis added).
86. Id. at 770.
87. Id. at 770-72. In Schmerber, the Court found that: (1) the defendant's manifest symp-
toms of intoxication created a strong likelihood that intoxication would be found; (2) exigency
existed because blood alcohol levels decline rapidly following ingestion; (3) the test was relia-
ble; (4) the test produced no particular anxiety in the defendant; and (5) the blood was ex-
tracted by a physician in an antiseptic environment. Because these factors were met, the
Schmerber Court held that the test was reasonable. Id.
88. 600 F. Supp. 1214 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
89. Id. at 1218 (citing Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 771).
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differentiated this type of search from traditional searches of clothing or
possessions because blood extraction is more intrusive.9" The Storms
court found that urinalysis is also more intrusive than traditional types of
searches. Quoting Schmerber, the Storms court reasoned that " '[t]he in-
terests in human dignity and privacy which the Fourth Amendment pro-
tects forbid [searches involving intrusion beyond the body's surface] on
the mere chance that desired evidence might be obtained.' "91 Relying
on Schmerber, the Storms court found urinalysis analogous to blood test-
ing.92 In doing so, the Storms court stated, "[a]lthough [urinalysis] in-
volves no forced penetration of body tissues, as does a blood test, it does
involve the involuntary extraction of body fluids. In that sense, if not
literally, it is an 'intrusion beyond the body's surface.' "9' Storms held
that urine tests, which in many respects are more private than blood
tests, were entitled to at least the level of scrutiny given blood tests,94 -
the level being a "clear indication that in fact such evidence [of drugs]
will be found." 95
The Schmerber standard for determining a reasonable expectation of
privacy governs situations involving drug testing of employees.9 6 In
McDonell v. Hunter,97 an employee urinalysis case, the court recognized
that urine is generally discharged and disposed under circumstances
where an individual has a "reasonable and legitimate expectation of pri-
90. Id. (citing Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 769-70).
91. Id. (quoting Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 769-70).
92. Id.
93. Id. (quoting Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 769). Body cavity searches also require a clear
indication that evidence will be found. Id. at 1219.
94. Id.
95. See id. (citing Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770). The Storms court, however, held that the
"clear indication" standard cannot apply to prison inmates because of the special security
needs of a prison. Id. The court also found that the likelihood of finding drugs through testing
of inmates is high enough to find "cause"-albeit of a lower level of cause than is required
under a normal standard. Id. at 1220.
96. See Shoemaker v. Handel, 619 F. Supp. 1089, 1098 (D.N.J. 1985) (for facts of Shoe-
maker, see infra text accompanying notes 135-36); McDonell v. Hunter, 612 F. Supp. 1122,
1127 (S.D. Iowa 1985) (for facts of McDonell, see infra text accompanying notes 154-55);
Allen v. City of Marietta, 601 F. Supp. 482, 488 (N.D. Ga. 1985) (for facts of Allen, see infra
text accompanying notes 117-22). It has been suggested that urinalysis is not unreasonable
when the results are used pursuant to the employer's policy and not for criminal investigation.
See Allen, 601 F. Supp. at 491. This contention is meritless. See Shoemaker, 619 F. Supp. at
1097-98 (citing Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 530 (1967)), and McDonell, 612 F.
Supp. at 1127 (citing Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. at 530) for the principle that people
are always protected by the fourth amendment, not just when they are under criminal
investigation.
97. 612 F. Supp. 1122 (S.D. Iowa 1985) (random drug urinalysis violated prison employ-
ees' fourth amendment right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure). For further
discussion, see infra notes 154-69 and accompanying text.
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vacy."' g Like Storms, the McDonell court recognized the distinction be-
tween blood tests, where an actual intrusion into the body is required,
and urinalysis, where the fluid is routinely discharged. The McDonnell
court similarly found a reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to
urinalysis.99 The McDonell court also discussed a person's privacy inter-
est in terms of the private information his or her body fluids contained."°°
Not only was taking the urine an invasion of privacy, but analyzing the
"personal physiological secrets it holds" constituted a similar invasion. 101
Schmerber governs because, as noted earlier, searches involving intru-
sions beyond the body's surface are an affront to human dignity and pri-
vacy.1"2 This kind of search is protected by the fourth amendment
because it is considered extremely intrusive.103
It is generally accepted, after Schmerber, 14 that persons have a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy to be free from bodily intrusions. Because
it is understood that individuals have a privacy interest when their urine
is being seized, courts generally focus on whether the government's pol-
icy of drug testing was reasonable in light of that expectation.
ii. defining the reasonableness standard for urinalysis by government:
using the Schmerber factors as a guide
Only unreasonable searches are prohibited by the fourth amend-
ment.10 5 Therefore, under the fourth amendment analysis, courts must
determine whether government drug testing by urinalysis was reasonable
in a given situation. Reasonableness is determined by weighing the indi-
vidual's expectation of privacy against the government's interest in test-
ing employees for drugs.106
Current federal case law does not define a clear test for when em-
ployee drug testing is reasonable and therefore constitutional. None of




102. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 769-70.
103. Id.
104. After Schmerber, it seems everyone has an expectation of privacy to be free from bod-
ily intrusions. The question then becomes: what government interests override their expecta-
tions of privacy?
105. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 147 (1925); see supra note 76 for text of fourth
amendment.
106. The government's interest is generally the safety of employees and the public. See, e.g.,
Allen v. City of Marietta, 601 F. Supp. 482 (N.D. Ga. 1985) (working with high voltage wires);
Shoemaker v. Handel, 619 F. Supp. 1089 (D.N.J. 1985) (horse racing); Division 241 Amalga-




the employee drug testing cases expressly apply the Schmerber analysis.
However, in an attempt to create a coherent approach to determine when
employee drug testing is constitutional under the United States Constitu-
tion, this Comment categorizes the "reasonableness" elements discussed
in the urinalysis cases into the Schmerber categories previously listed. 107
This Comment will later utilize this approach as a guideline to determine
when urinalysis of private employees is reasonable under the California
Constitution.1
0 8
The earliest federal case involving the urinalysis of employees was
Division 241 Amalgamated Transit Union v. Suscy. 109 In Suscy, a bus
drivers union, on behalf of 5500 bus operators and other Chicago Transit
Authority (CTA) employees, brought suit against CTA officials alleging
that certain rules regarding employee drug testing were unconstitu-
tional."' The union asked the court to hold the rules invalid under the
fourth and fourteenth amendments. In response, the court stated that
the CTA only had to prove that its rule was reasonable. If the rule was
reasonable, a governmental agency could place various conditions on em-
ployment, such as urinalysis to detect drugs."'
The Suscy court balanced the workers' expectation to be free from
blood and urine drug testing against the CTA's interest in protecting the
public by ensuring that bus and train operators performed their jobs
safely.112 The court held that the CTA's "paramount interest" of pro-
tecting the public outweighed the employees' expectation of privacy."'
The court stated that the safety of mass transit riders "certainly" out-
weighs an individual's interest in refusing to disclose information regard-
ing intoxication.
1 14
The Suscy court buttressed the reasonableness argument by empha-
sizing the procedural protections given employees. These safeguards in-
cluded the CTA's requirements that, before requesting a test, operating
employees be either directly involved in a serious accident or suspected of
being under the influence of drugs or liquor. Even then, testing could
only be performed if two supervisory employees agreed that it was neces-
sary. This requirement satisfied the Schmerber factor which required a
107. See supra note 87 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Schmerber factors.
108. See infra notes 287-314 and accompanying text.
109. 538 F.2d 1264 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1029 (1976).
110. Id. at 1265-66.
111. Id. at 1267.
112. Id.
113. Id. The Suscy court did not articulate why an employee had an expectation of privacy;
the expectation was assumed. See supra text accompanying notes 96 & 102-03.
114. Id.
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high likelihood that a test would in fact discover intoxication. The Suscy
court also emphasized that the tests were only performed in hospitals, a
factor indicating that the manner of testing was reasonable-Schmerber
factor number five. The testing of CTA employees was not random-
probable cause was necessary before the employee was required to take a
test.115 Thus, with the exception of the "reliability of the test" factor,116
the Suscy court applied the equivalent of the reasonableness factors of
Schmerber to the urinalysis procedure at issue.
All other cases involving governmental urinalysis of employees were
district court cases decided in 1985. The first of these cases was Allen v.
City of Marietta."7 In Allen, plaintiffs were employed by the Electrical
Division of the Board of Lights and Power and worked around high volt-
age electric wires."' There were reports of drug usage by employees and
there were a large number of Board employee injuries. Management be-
lieved that because of the extremely hazardous nature of the work, drug
usage on the job threatened the safety of both employees and the public.
To determine which employees were using drugs on the job, an under-
cover agent was planted in the electrical distribution division. The agent
kept detailed records of who he saw smoking marijuana and when these
instances occurred. Based on this information, management felt that it
had accumulated enough evidence to terminate certain employees. These
employees were given the opportunity to submit to a urine test or be
fired. The employees then submitted to the test, which showed mari-
juana present in all of the employees' systems. 119 The employees were all
fired; however, it was not clear whether they were fired because of the
positive urine tests or the prior information regarding drug use. 120 At a
Pension Board hearing, established for employee grievances, the plaintiffs
were confronted by and were allowed to cross-examine witnesses. The
Pension Board unanimously found that the Board of Lights and Power
had cause for its decision to terminate the plaintiffs.
1 21
The plaintiffs in Allen then brought the case to federal court, assert-
ing that the urine tests performed by their employer were unreasonable
searches and seizures under the fourth and fourteenth amendments.' 22
115. Id.
116. See supra note 87 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Schmerber factors.
117. 601 F. Supp. 482 (N.D. Ga. 1985).
118. Id. at 484.
119. Id. Marijuana can remain in the body a month after ingestion. See supra notes 39-45
and accompanying text for further discussion of this point.
120. Allen, 601 F. Supp. at 484-85.
121. Id. at 486.
122. Id.
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The Allen court examined the reasonableness of the search, concluding
that under the circumstances presented testing was reasonable. Reasona-
bleness was found in part because the tests were administered strictly in
an employment context 123 as part of the government's legitimate inquiry
into the use of drugs by employees engaged in hazardous jobs.' 24
The court found that the government has the right, as an employer,
to investigate employee misconduct which is directly relevant to job per-
formance. 125 The Allen court summarized the governmental intrusion
into employees' privacy as follows:
Government employees do not surrender their fourth amend-
ment rights merely because they go to work for the govern-
ment. They have as much of a right to be free from warrantless
government searches as any other citizens. At the same time,
however, the government has the same right as any private em-
ployer to oversee its employees and investigate potential mis-
conduct relevant to the employee's performance of his duties.
126
The court in Allen held that the city had the right to conduct war-
rantless searches, in the form of urinalysis, of employees engaged in haz-
ardous work to determine whether the employee used or abused drugs
which would affect his or her ability to perform work safely.' 27 The
Allen court relied heavily on the status of the parties, namely the em-
ployee-employer relationship, to find the drug test reasonable. 28 This
analysis is faulty. The suggestion that a lower standard is acceptable
where the government acts as employer rather than as law enforcer has
been expressly rejected in other cases. 129  The Allen court should have
placed less emphasis on the employment nature of the search and more
emphasis on the state's valid interest of safety, which was the approach
123. The court's attempt to downplay the intrusiveness of the search was based on the fact
that the search was in the employment rather than criminal context. Id. at 491. This distinc-
tion, however, is not valid. People are protected by the fourth amendment in all situations, not
just when they are under criminal investigation. See supra note 96.
124. Allen, 601 F. Supp. at 491.
125. The Allen court distinguished the government's right as an employer from its right as a
law enforcer. Id. at 489 (citations omitted). But see supra note 96.
126. Allen, 601 F. Supp. at 491 (emphasis added). This Comment addresses what "right"
private employers in California actually possess. The court in Allen did not discuss what this
right is. It simply said that the government has the "same right" as private employers. This
Comment defines a private employer's right to conduct urinalysis by analogy to cases involving
government employment. See infra notes 247-316 and accompanying text. This approach is
used because there is no state case or statutory law on point. See supra note 65 and accompa-
nying text.
127. Allen, 601 F. Supp. at 484.
128. Id.
129. See supra notes 96 & 123 and accompanying text.
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of the Suscy court. 130 Instead, the Allen court merely alluded to the im-
portant state interest by discussing the extreme hazard involved in work-
ing around high voltage wires.I31 The Allen court should have concluded
that the government test was reasonable by balancing the employees' rea-
sonable expectation of privacy against the government's legitimate inter-
est in safety. The court fully discussed the employees' expectation of
privacy regarding drug tests,I32 but did not apply the appropriate balanc-
ing test. The Allen facts are parallel to Suscy in that reasonableness in
both cases was buttressed by procedural safeguards' 33-the fifth factor of
the Schmerber reasonableness test.
Despite the faulty analysis, three factors that were considered by the
Allen court indicate that the tests were in fact reasonable. First, the tests
were not random. 134 Second, the workers were involved in extremely
hazardous activity, a factor which strengthens the government's interest.
Third, there were procedural safeguards.
Another district court case, Shoemaker v. Handel, 35 addressed the
constitutionality of random blood and urine drug testing of horse racing
jockeys. The plaintiff jockeys alleged that a regulation created by the
New Jersey Racing Commission'36 violated their fourth amendment
rights to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. The regulation
in part allowed the State Steward to require a jockey to submit to a post-
race urine test. 13  Unlike the testing in Suscy and Allen, the drug testing
in Shoemaker was random. That is, no individual suspicion or probable
cause was required before a jockey was required to submit to a test.'
38
The Shoemaker court acknowledged the fourth amendment implications,
and found that urine tests are "essentially indistinguishable from blood
tests which have been held by the Supreme Court to 'plainly constitute
searches of "persons," and depend antecedently upon the seizures of
"persons," within the meaning of that Amendment.' """3 The court fur-
130. Suscy, 538 F.2d at 1264. See supra notes 112-14 and accompanying text.
131. Allen, 601 F. Supp. at 484.
132. Id. at 488-89.
133. See supra text accompanying note 115 for a discussion of the procedural safeguards
involved in Suscy.
134. Whether the evidence in Allen showed that there was a clear indication of intoxication,
as required by Schmerber, is a question of fact. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
135. 619 F. Supp. 1089 (D.N.J. 1985).
136. The New Jersey Racing Commission, established by the New Jersey State Legislature,
was given broad powers, including: jurisdiction over anyone, including persons, partnerships,
associations, or corporations, who conducts horse racing for any "stake, purse or reward" in
New Jersey. See id. at 1093 n.3.
137. Id. at 1094.
138. Id. at 1097.
139. Id. at 1098 (quoting Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966)).
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ther found that both forms of testing involve "the forced extraction of
bodily fluids-albeit by different means,"'I and that "urine searches im-
plicate the interests in human dignity and privacy found to be at stake in
Schmerber."'41  However, the court stated that random tests without
probable cause are not a per se violation of the fourth amendment. The
Shoemaker court found a jockey's expectation of privacy diminished due
to the highly regulated nature of the industry.'42 The gambling industry
is noted as being pervasively regulated in order to minimize the "criminal
influence to which it is so prone."' 43
The Shoemaker court found that the requirement of individualized
suspicion was not absolute'" but that, in the situations where the bal-
ance of interests preclude "some quantum of individualized suspicion,"
other safeguards are necessary to ensure that intrusion into the tested
person's expectation of privacy is not "subject to the discretion of the
official in the field."' 45  The court thus seemed to apply a modified
Schmerber-type test.'46 The Shoemaker court's analysis differs greatly
from Schmerber in one major respect-the court in Shoemaker did not
require a clear indication that intoxication would be found, as mandated
by Schmerber. However, the Shoemaker court did discuss and rely upon
factors similar to the other four Schmerber factors. The court only omit-
ted the "likelihood drugs will be found" requirement if the other require-
ments adequately prevent unfettered discretion and minimize the
intrusion into an individual's privacy interest.'4 7
The Shoemaker court raised, but then essentially ignored, the issue
that urine tests are unable to distinguish present intoxication from intoxi-
140. Id. (citing Storms v. Coughlin, 600 F. Supp 1214, 1218 (S.D.N.Y. 1984)).
141. Id.
142. Id. at 1098-1102. The court noted that "'[t]he danger of clandestine and dishonest
activity inherent in the business of horseracing has been well recognized.'" Id. at 1100 (quot-
ing Delguidice v. New Jersey Racing Comm'n, 100 N.J. 79, 90, 494 A.2d 1007, 1012 (1985)).
The court discussed the jockey's lowered expectation of privacy by analogizing horse rac-
ing to other industries with pervasive governmental regulation, such as: liquor, see Colonnade
Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 77 (1970), and firearms, see United States v.
Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316 (1972). Shoemaker, 619 F. Supp. at 1099.
143. Shoemaker, 619 F. Supp. at 1099.
144. Id. at 1100.
145. Id. at 1101 (citation omitted).
146. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
147. Shoemaker, 619 F. Supp. at 1101. Among the procedural safeguards presented in
Shoemaker were: (1) "neutral" administration of the tests, giving each jockey an equal chance
of being chosen, but see Storms v. Coughlin, 600 F. Supp. 1214, 1224 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (dis-
cussing problems associated with "random" selection); (2) sufficient guard against "false posi-
tives," Shoemaker, 619 F. Supp. at 1104, but see supra notes 46-54 and accompanying text; and
(3) jockey's ability to request a hearing to challenge the test results or any penalties. Shoe-
maker, 619 F. Supp at 1104.
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cation during off-racetrack hours.1 48  The court incorrectly addressed
this problem by stating that the government had sufficiently protected
against "false positives."'149  As discussed earlier, the inability to deter-
mine present intoxication and the threat of "false positives" are two dif-
ferent inquiries. 50
As in Suscy and Allen, safety was a major concern of the Shoemaker
court.' The Shoemaker court said that "the state has a vital interest in
ensuring that horse races are safely and honestly run and that the public
perceives them as so."' 52 The safety interest thus promotes the integrity
of horse racing as well as reduces the risk of serious injury to jockeys."3
It appears that the random drug testing was allowed because the court
found that individuals involved with horse racing have a lowered expec-
tation of privacy, not because the government's interest is as great or
greater than an individual's normal expectation of privacy.
The third district court case in this area is McDonell v. Hunter.
5 4
In McDonell, employees of the Iowa Department of Corrections brought
suit claiming the Department's policy that prison employees submit to
random drug urinalysis, breathalizer and blood tests upon the request of
Department officials was unconstitutional. The plaintiffs sought relief on
the grounds that such testing violated their fourth amendment rights as
148. Shoemaker, 619 F. Supp. at 1104. The tests are not designed to detect present intoxi-
cation. See supra notes 39-45 and accompanying text for an explanation of what urinalysis is
able to detect.
149. Shoemaker, 619 F. Supp. at 1104.
150. See supra notes 39-46 and accompanying text. One deals with accuracy, the other with
what the tests are able to detect.
151. Shoemaker, 619 F. Supp. at 1102.
152. Id.
153. Id. The court stated that "[t]he risk of serious injury is apparent, given the speed and
closeness with which large numbers of horses run during a race. Even the slightest decrease in
alertness and reflex ability increases the danger of accidents, including multiple horse and
jockey accidents causing grave injury and death." Id.
The Shoemaker court distinguished its case from McDonell v. Hunter, 612 F. Supp. 1122
(S.D. Iowa 1985), where the court struck down random urine testing of prison employees. See
infra notes 154-69 and accompanying text for discussion. The Shoemaker court found that
one major difference was that the harm in Shoemaker was "real-not attenuated." 619 F.
Supp. at 1102. Another distinction relied on was that "horseracing is one of a special class of
relatively unique industries which have been subject to pervasive and continuous regulation by
the state." Id. See also supra note 142 and accompanying text. Quoting a New Jersey
Supreme Court decision that discussed the similarity between horse racing, casino gambling
and liquor, the Shoemaker court stated that "'[tihe legislative power to regulate such a
"nonessential and inherently dangerous commodity". . . has been said to be almost without
limit."' Id. at 1099 (quoting In re Application of Boardwalk Regency Casino Corp. for a
Casino License, 180 N.J. Super. 324, 341, 434 A.2d 1111, 1120 (App. Div. 1981)).
154. 612 F. Supp. 1122 (S.D. Iowa 1985).
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well as their right to privacy-"'
The court in McDonell, unlike Allen, 156 held that there was no dif-
ference between a governmental search for employment purposes and a
search for criminal purposes. 157 The McDonell court stated that "[a]ll of
us are protected by the Fourth Amendment all of the time, not just when
police suspect us of criminal conduct."1 18 The McDonell court held that
although urine is "routinely discharged from the body" and requires no
actual intrusion as does blood extraction, the circumstances under which
urine is discharged are circumstances where a person "certainly has a
reasonable and legitimate expectation of privacy."159
In discussing the Correction Department's interest in conducting
drug tests, the McDonell court recognized every employer's general de-
sire to eliminate drugs from the workplace16 and discussed the specific
interest of a prison. 6 The Correction Department's purpose for requir-
ing urinalysis of employees was to identify drug smugglers and users be-
cause "it is undesirable" to have drug users working in a correctional
institution, even if the users do not smuggle drugs to inmates. 162
The McDonell court balanced the prison employees' reasonable and
legitimate expectation of privacy against the government's interest, and
held that the purpose of identifying drug users and smugglers is not a
sufficient reason for a general policy requiring random blood and urine
samples from prison employees. The court concluded that the Depart-
ment's random testing policy violated the correction employees' fourth
amendment rights.1 61 If there had been a reasonable suspicion based on
155. Id. at 1125.
156. Allen, 601 F. Supp. at 489-90; see supra notes 125-26 and accompanying text.
157. See supra notes 123, 129-31.
158. McDonell, 612 F. Supp. at 1127; see supra note 96 and accompanying text.
159. McDonell, 612 F. Supp. at 1127. The court emphasized that drug testing by urinalysis
is in fact a substantial intrusion into an individual's privacy:
There is no question that one's person. . . [is a place] where one has a reason-
able or legitimate expectation of privacy. . . . Urine, unlike blood, is routinely dis-
charged from the body, so no governmental intrusion into the body is required to
seize urine. However, urine is discharged and disposed of under circumstances
where the person certainly has a reasonable and legitimate expectation of privacy.
One does not reasonably expect to discharge urine under circumstances making it
available to others to collect and analyze in order to discover the personal physiologi-
cal secrets it holds . . ... One clearly has a reasonable and legitimate expectation of
privacy in such personal information contained in his body fluids.
Id. (footnote omitted).
160. Id. at 1130.
161. Id. at 1128. The court found that "[a]lthough the preservation of security and order
within the prison in [sic] unquestionably a weighty state interest, prison officials are not unlim-
ited in ferreting out contraband." Id.
162. Id. at 1130.
163. Id.
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objective facts that an employee was under the influence of drugs while at
work, it is likely that the McDonell court would have held the testing
constitutional. 1" The court said that demanding a urine, breath or blood
specimen to test for drugs from an employee who enters the prison is
acceptable if there is a "reasonable suspicion, based on specific objective
facts and reasonable inferences drawn from those facts.., that the em-
ployee is then under the influence of alcoholic beverages or controlled
substances." '165 This would fall under factor one of the Schmerber
test. 166 The court also indicated the importance of procedural safeguards
and standards necessary to make a urinalysis policy reasonable. 167 Clear
standards and procedures are necessary to avoid tests at an employer's
"unfettered discretion."
' 168
In the context of discussing other means for protecting against em-
ployee drug smuggling, the McDonell court noted that the state could
and should carefully screen and investigate the background of employ-
ment applicants. It also suggested that if on a particular day an em-
ployee is the object of mere suspicion, the employee could be told to leave
for that day, and therefore not have any contact with inmates.
1 69
The following discussion summarizes the Schmerber test discussed
above and how the cited urinalysis cases applied the various Schmerber
factors 7° The first requirement, which looks to "the likelihood that in-
toxication would be found," required a "clear indication that in fact...
evidence will be found." '17 1 This is dealt with either implicitly or explic-
itly in all of the urinalysis cases discussed in this Comment. The
McDonell court found that this requirement was not met because the
testing was random. Therefore, testing was an unreasonable search and
seizure.172 In Shoemaker, the random testing policy admittedly failed to
meet the standard, but the court distinguished the unique nature of the
horse racing industry from the usual facts which require as a prerequisite
"some quantum of individualized suspicion." 173 The facts of Allen and
Suscy indicate that there was at least some degree of suspicion that intox-
164. See id. at 1132.
165. Id. at 1130 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). The court, in its discussion of strip
searches of employees, also required a "reasonable suspicion" standard, rather than a "mere
suspicion" standard. Id. at 1129.
166. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
167. McDonell, 612 F. Supp. at 1128 n.4.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 1129-30.
170. See supra note 87 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Schmerber factors.
171. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770.
172. McDonell, 612 F. Supp. at 1130.
173. Shoemaker, 619 F. Supp. at 1100 (citing United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S.
1474
June 1986] URINAL YSIS 1475
ication would be found-the tests were certainly not random.174 Storms
v. Coughlin, which dealt with drug testing of inmates rather than em-
ployees, found that the standard was necessarily lower for inmates be-
cause of the special security needs of a prison, 175 as well as the increased
likelihood that an inmate would be intoxicated.
1 76
The second Schmerber reasonableness factor was the "exigency cre-
ated by the metabolism of alcohol," because of the blood alcohol's rapid
decline following ingestion.1 7 7 This factor was not directly discussed in
the cited urinalysis cases, perhaps because drugs, especially marijuana,
do not leave the body very quickly and may be detected by a urine test
for up to thirty-six days. 178 This fact indicates that a warrantless urine
test is not reasonable.
The third factor, "reliability of the test," was discussed at length
only in Storms.179 There, the court noted many of the problems regard-
ing the Emit Test, including that it does not indicate intoxication at the
time of testing,'8 0 and the threat of "false positives."'' Shoemaker also
recognized that urine tests are not designed to indicate intoxication at the
time of testing, but rather only recent use. 182 As discussed earlier, the
Shoemaker court did not make a very convincing showing that this prob-
543, 560-61 (1976)). See supra note 153 and accompanying text for discussion of how the
Shoemaker court distinguished the Shoemaker facts from McDonell.
174. In Suscy, an employee either had to be involved in a serious accident or be under
suspicion of actual intoxication before a test was administered. Additionally, two supervisors
had to agree the testing was necessary. Suscy, 538 F.2d at 1267. Similarly, in Allen, the tested
employees were actually observed smoking marijuana. 601 F. Supp. 482,484 (N.D. Ga. 1985).
175. Storms, 600 F. Supp. at 1218.
176. Id. at 1220. The Storms court took judicial notice of the fact that drug use among
prisoners in America is a serious, disruptive problem. Therefore, it found that the likelihood
that any inmate picked at random was under the influence of intoxicating drugs was very high.
Id. at 1220. See supra note 95. However, the court emphasized that strong procedural safe-
guards were required for various reasons. One reason was to ensure accurate tests. See 600 F.
Supp. at 1221-22, discussing the serious weakness of Emit Test. The Storms court required
that any positive test be confirmed by an alternate method. Id. at 1221. Another reason was
to avoid use of tests to harass inmates. The court recognized this potential for abuse, and
required that random selection of inmates for urinalysis be conducted by a method not prone
to the conscious or subconscious selection by prison employees. The court enjoined the prison
from drawing inmates' name cards because it unnecessarily exposed inmates to the risk of
harassment. Id. at 1223.
177. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
178. See supra notes 39-45 and accompanying text.
179. 600 F. Supp. at 1221-22.
180. Id. at 1222. See also supra notes 39-45 and accompanying text for a detailed discus-
sion of the Emit Test's shortcomings in this area.
181. 600 F. Supp at 1221-22. See also supra notes 46-54 and accompanying text.
182. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
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lem was remedied.18 3
The fourth Schmerber factor was the "defendant's response to the
process of blood extraction." 18 4 This was not at issue in the cases cited in
this Comment-possibly because urinalysis is not considered to produce
any particular anxiety other than the recognized invasion into the indi-
vidual's privacy. A different finding might result where the person tested
is forced to urinate in front of another to ensure reliability.
1 85
The fifth element is of major importance in deciding whether a urine
test was reasonable. This element was "the manner in which the test was
done." '186 Shoemaker suggested this was extremely important because
individualized suspicion was not required in that case.817 Suscy and Al-
len both discussed procedures that weighed in favor of the reasonableness
of testing.1 88 In Suscy, the court stated that "the conditions under which
the intrusion is made and the manner of taking the samples are reason-
able."' 89 Procedural protections included the requirements that tests be
given only to operating employees directly involved in a serious accident
or suspected of being intoxicated and that they be given only if two su-
pervisory employees agreed that the test was needed. The court also
noted that since the tests were performed in a hospital, this constituted a
reasonable procedure. 190 In Allen, procedural safeguards included the
right to appeal the finding as well as the right to cross-examine
witnesses.191
One factor which was not relevant to Schmerber, and therefore not
among the Schmerber reasonableness factors, was balancing the threat to
worker and public safety posed by a drug debilitated employee. This
safety factor is relevant to the reasonableness of a search and seizure of
an employee's body fluid, because it increases the strength of the em-
ployer's interest in conducting the test. Suscy, Allen and Shoemaker all
based the reasonableness and importance of conducting the urine test on
the extreme hazards that could result from the worker's impairment.1 9
2
The federal employee urinalysis cases to date have not expressly re-
lied on the Schmerber factors, nor have any cases applied all the factors.
183. See supra notes 149-50 and accompanying text.
184. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
185. See infra note 317 and accompanying text.
186. See supra text accompanying note 87.
187. 619 F. Supp. at 1101; see supra notes 138-47 and accompanying text.
188. See supra text accompanying notes 115 & 121.
189. Suscy, 538 F.2d at 1267.
190. Id.
191. Allen, 601 F. Supp. at 486.
192. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
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However, as indicated earlier, these cases have applied the factors in va-
rying degrees. The proposal section of this Comment will use these fac-
tors, as outlined above, to help create a test to determine when urinalysis
of private employees is constitutional under the right to privacy provided
in the California Constitution. All employees, whether public or private,
deserve and expect privacy in their lives. This must be strenuously pro-
tected, particularly when something as vital as one's job is at stake.
Thus, the federal analysis provides a useful analogy for the California test
of constitutionality.
IV. CALIFORNIA'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO PRIVACY
The California Constitution explicitly guarantees the right to pri-
vacy.193 The first judicial interpretation of this right to privacy occurred
in White v. Davis. 194 In White, the California Supreme Court discussed
the police practice of enrolling officers as students in a major university
for the purpose of compiling police dossiers on students and professors.
The court held that this practice created, among other things, 195 a prima
facie violation of the plaintiff's expliit right to privacy under the right to
privacy amendment to the constitution.
196
The White court explained that there was a need for the explicit
constitutional right to privacy even though courts had consistently given
a broad reading to the implicit right to privacy. 97 The court reasoned
that the increased threat to privacy posed by surveillance and data collec-
tion in contemporary society necessitated such a provision. 198 Cases de-
cided after White dealing with the state constitutional right to privacy
said the new constitutional right did more than restate an already ex-
isting right; instead, it was intended to expand the right already set forth
in prior court decisions. 199
193. Article I, section 1 of the California Constitution provides: "All people are by nature
free and independent and have inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and defending life
and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety,
happiness, and privacy." CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1 (emphasis added).
194. 13 Cal. 3d 757, 533 P.2d 222, 120 Cal. Rptr. 94 (1975). See Fleming, The Supreme
Court of California 1974-1975, 64 CALIF. L. Rnv. 239, 347 (1976).
195. The White court found that the police practice violated freedom of speech and assem-
bly as well as the state constitutional right to privacy. 13 Cal. 3d at 760, 533 P.2d at 224, 120
Cal. Rptr. at 96.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 773-74, 533 P.2d at 233, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 105.
198. Id. at 774, 533 P.2d at 233, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 105.
199. See Porten v. University of San Francisco, 64 Cal. App. 3d 825, 829, 134 Cal. Rptr.
839, 841-42 (1976). The Porten court stated that "[t]he elevation of the right to be free from
invasion of privacy to constitutional stature was apparently intended to be an expansion of the
privacy right." Id. The court also quoted the voter pamphlet language that "'[t]his simple
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The White court and the courts that followed had little legislative
guidance to aid their interpretation of the new constitutional provi-
sion.2"° Therefore, the courts relied heavily on the ballot argument in-
cluded in the election brochure which favored the adoption of
Proposition Eleven, which was to add the right to privacy to the Califor-
nia Constitution.210 This ballot argument was essentially the only legis-
lative history available.
The language of the ballot argument has been adopted in California
right to privacy cases. White quoted the ballot argument's statement that
" '[aft present there are no effective restraints on the information activities
of government and business. This amendment creates a legal and enforce-
able right of privacy for every Californian.' "202 White also emphasized
the ballot argument's conclusion that "'[t]he right of privacy is an im-
portant American heritage and essential to the fundamental rights guar-
anteed by the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments to the
U.S. Constitution. This right should be abridged only when there is a
compelling public need. .. .1,23o The ballot argument further explained
that "'[t]he right of privacy is the right to be left alone. It is a funda-
mental and compelling interest. It protects our homes, our families, our
thoughts, our emotions, our expressions, our personalities, our freedom
of communion, and our freedom to associate with the people we
choose.' 204
amendment will extend various court decisions on privacy to insure protection of our basic
rights."' Id. (quoting CAL. SECRETARY OF STATE, PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO CONSTITU-
TION 28 (Nov. 7, 1972)) (emphasis added by court).
200. See, eg., White, 13 Cal. 3d at 774, 533 P.2d at 233, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 105; Porten v.
University of Cal., San Francisco, 64 Cal. App. 3d 825, 829, 134 Cal. Rptr. 839, 841-42 (1976).
In Porten, the court explained that "[i]n White v. Davis, the California Supreme Court
pointed to the election brochure argument as the only legislative history available in construing
the constitutional amendment." Porten, 64 Cal. App. 3d at 829 n.1, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 842 n.1
(citing White, 13 Cal. 3d at 774, 533 P.2d at 233, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 105). See infra notes 233-38
and accompanying text for discussion of Porten.
201. CAL. SECRETARY OF STATE, PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO CONSTITUTION 26 (Nov. 7,
1972) [hereinafter cited as CALIFORNIA VOTER PAMPHLET].
202. White, 13 Cal. 3d at 774, 533 P.2d at 233, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 105 (citing CALIFORNIA
VOTER PAMPHLET, supra note 201, at 26 (emphasis in original)).
203. Id. at 775, 533 P.2d at 234, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 106 (quoting CALIFORNIA VOTER PAM-
PHLET, supra note 201, at 27) (emphasis added by this Comment).
"Because of the lack of explicit federal constitutional language guaranteeing a right to
privacy, courts have. . . had to decide privacy issues under constitutional provisions aimed at
protecting other interests." Fleming, supra note 194, at 352. Hence, "[t]he sponsors of the
amendment [to California's constitution article I, section 1] assumed in the election brochure
argument that the amendment's language encompassed an already existing right [to privacy]."
Id.
204. White, 13 Cal. 3d at 774, 533 P.2d at 233, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 105 (quoting CALIFORNIA
VOTER PAMPHLET, supra note 201, at 27).
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This respect for privacy has been strengthened and better defined in
the years since White. California courts continue to stress that the right
to privacy is a fundamental right guaranteed to all by article I, section
1.205 They acknowledge that the California Constitution requires weigh-
ing a compelling state interest against the individual privacy interest to
determine if the privacy right may be invaded.20 6 Even when a compel-
ling state interest is found to outweigh a privacy interest, the courts have
found that the California Constitution requires that the intrusion be nec-
essary and narrowly tailored to achieve the goal.2 °7
The scope of the constitutional right to privacy has certainly not
been exhausted. The California Supreme Court in City of Santa Barbara
v. Adamson2 "8 stated that" 'the general concept of privacy relates. . . to
205. See, e.g., City of Santa Barbara v. Adamson, 27 Cal. 3d 123, 130, 610 P.2d 436, 439,
164 Cal. Rptr. 539, 542 (1980) (reaffirming White, which stated that the" 'right of privacy is
the right to be left alone. It is a fundamental and compelling interest." (quoting White, 13
Cal. 3d at 774-75, 533 P.2d at 233-34, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 105-06) (emphasis added in Santa
Barbara)); Rulon-Miller v. IBM, 162 Cal. App. 3d 241, 255, 208 Cal. Rptr. 524, 534 (1984)
(citing City of San Francisco v. Superior Court, 125 Cal. App. 3d 879, 882, 178 Cal. Rptr. 435,
437 (1981)) (right to privacy is "unquestionably a 'fundamental interest of our society' "). See
supra notes 273-74 and accompanying text for discussion of Rulon-Miller.
206. See, e.g., City of Santa Barbara v. Adamson, 27 Cal. 3d 123, 130, 610 P.2d 436, 439,
164 Cal. Rptr. 539, 542 (1980); San Francisco v. Superior Court, 125 Cal. App. 3d 879, 882-
83, 178 Cal. Rptr. 435, 437 ("[W]hen the [compelling interest] conflicts with the constitutional
right of privacy, there should be a 'careful balancing' of the 'compelling public need' ...
against the 'fundamental right of privacy.' "); Jones v. Superior Court, 119 Cal. App. 3d 534,
174 Cal. Rptr. 148 (1981). Jones involved the right to privacy regarding information of obstet-
rical-gynecological history sought by defendants in a case involving a mother's ingestion of
diethylstilbestrol (DES) during pregnancy. The court in Jones held that when there is an
intrusion upon a constitutionally protected area of privacy, a court must balance the individ-
ual's rights against a compelling state interest. Id. at 550, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 157-58 (citations
omitted).
207. See, e.g., City of Santa Barbara v. Adamson, 27 Cal. 3d 123, 133, 610 P.2d 436, 441,
164 Cal. Rptr. 539, 544 (1980); Wood v. Superior Court, 166 Cal. App. 3d 1138, 212 Cal.
Rptr. 811 (1985). In Wood, the court held that the means to achieve the compelling interest
must be unavoidable. If alternative means will achieve the desired result while minimizing the
intrusion into privacy, those means must be adopted. The Wood court held that mere conven-
ience of means or cost will not satisfy this requirement, because this would make expediency
and not a compelling interest the overriding value. In Reynaud v. Superior Court, the court
stated:
While the right of privacy is not absolute, it is well established that the propriety of
any governmental intrusion upon the right will depend upon the showing that the
intrusion was justified by a state need which was compelling not only in the abstract
but also when weighed against the privacy rights of the individual and that the scope
of the intrusion was no greater than could be justified by the states' need in all
circumstances.
138 Cal. App. 3d 1, 7-8, 187 Cal. Rptr. 660, 664 (1982).
208. 27 Cal. 3d 123, 610 P.2d 436, 164 Cal. Rptr. 539 (1980).
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an enormously broad and diverse field of personal action and belief' "209
and that there is a "wide variety of contexts in which the constitutional
[right to] privacy analysis has been employed." 210 This is because the
nature of "privacy" requires a case by case analysis of whether a person
has a reasonable expectation of privacy and whether a compelling inter-
est outweighs that right. The basic test in California to determine a pri-
vacy violation is whether a person's "personal and objectively"
reasonable expectation of privacy has been infringed upon.211 Among
the protected areas recognized thus far are: the right to be free from
surveillance and data collection;2 12 the right to live with whomever one
pleases;213 the right to be free from the gathering of private records;
214
the right of an employee to be free from discipline for off-work activity
not affecting his or her job;215 and the right to be left alone with respect
209. Id. at 129, 610 P.2d at 439, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 542 (quoting White, 13 Cal. 3d at 773-74,
533 P.2d at 233, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 105).
210. Id. (quoting White, 13 Cal. 3d at 773-74 n.10, 533 P.2d at 233 n.10, 120 Cal. Rptr. at
105 n.10).
211. See People ex rel. Franchise Tax Bd. v. Superior Court, 164 Cal. App. 3d 526, 540-41,
210 Cal. Rptr. 695, 703-04 (1985); Armenta v. Superior Court, 61 Cal. App. 3d 584, 588, 132
Cal. Rptr. 586, 588 (1976) ("The basic test of whether there has been a violation [of Califor-
nia's constitutional right to privacy] is if a person's personal and objectively reasonable expec-
tation of privacy has been infringed by unreasonable governmental intrusion.").
212. Privacy and surveillance were the primary targets at which the constitutional amend-
ment was aimed. See White, 13 Cal. 3d at 774, 533 P.2d at 233, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 105.
"Although the full contours of the new constitutional provision have as yet not even tenta-
tively been sketched, we have concluded that the surveillance and data gathering activities
challenged in this case do fall within the aegis of" article I, § 1 of the California Constitution.
Id. See supra text accompanying note 195 for a discussion of White.
213. See Santa Barbara v. Adamson, 27 Cal. 3d 123, 610 P.2d 436, 164 Cal. Rptr. 539
(1980). In Santa Barbara, the City of Santa Barbara passed a zoning ordinance that limited
the number of unrelated people who could live together in a house. The court relied on the
voter pamphlet's statement that the right to privacy extends to one's home. Id. at 130, 610
P.2d at 439, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 542. See supra text accompanying notes 200-04 for a discussion
of the ballot argument. The Santa Barbara court quoted the dissent in a United States
Supreme Court case which held that an ordinance similar to the one in Santa Barbara did not
violate the United States Constitution: "[tihe choice of household companions-of whether a
person's 'intellectual and emotional needs' are best met by living with family, friends, profes-
sional associates, or others-involves deeply personal considerations . . . . That decision
surely falls within the ambit of the right to privacy protected by the Constitution.'" 27 Cal. 3d
at 130 n.3, 610 P.2d at 440 n.3, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 543 n.3 (quoting Village of Belle Terre v.
Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 16 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting)).
214. See Burrows v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 3d 238, 243, 529 P.2d 590, 593, 118 Cal. Rptr.
166, 169 (1974) (police could not obtain plaintiff's bank statement without warrant because
bank customers have reasonable expectation that statements will be used only for internal
banking matters); People v. McKunes, 51 Cal. App. 3d 487, 124 Cal. Rptr. 126 (1975) (using
same approach to prohibit police from obtaining records of defendant's telephone calls from
phone company).
215. See Rulon-Miller v. IBM, 162 Cal. App. 3d 241, 208 Cal. Rptr. 524 (1984).
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to what people generally consider private-including going to the rest-
room, which was the subject of People v. Triggs.2 6 In Triggs, the Califor-
nia Supreme Court recognized that "private parts and bodily functions"
are considered intensely private by everyone.2" 7
One commentator, in an article defining and explaining California's
constitutional right to privacy,21 discussed the "right to bodily integ-
rity." 9 He stated that "any search of the body that is aimed at disclos-
ing .. .aspect[s] of private life, or that involves the 'private parts,'"
invades privacy because "the intensity of their connection with our pri-
vate lives makes any imposed disclosure of them a potential invasion of
private life itself."22  The author cited People v. Scott 22 1 as an example of
this principle.222 In Scott, a compelled examination involving the mas-
sage of the prostate gland to disclose venereal disease was found to be a
clear invasion of privacy. 223 The court held that such a procedure re-
quired especially strong justification because it involved "the most inti-
mate of bodily functions, traditionally and universally regarded as
private."
224
In another case dealing with the privacy right to bodily integrity,
Jones v. Superior Court,2 25 the court stated that "[t]he individual's right
to privacy encompasses not only the state of his mind, but also his vis-
cera, detailed complaints of physical ills, and their emotional over-
tones." 226 The court further stated that "a person's gastro-intestinal
tract is as much entitled to privacy. . . as is that person's bank account,
the contents of his library or his membership in the NAACP. '227 The
court concluded that "the specie of privacy here sought to be invaded
216. 8 Cal. 3d 884, 506 P.2d 232, 106 Cal. Rptr. 408 (1973), disapproved on other grounds,
People v. Lilienthal, 22 Cal. 3d 891, 587 P.2d 706, 150 Cal. Rptr. 910 (1978). In Triggs, the
court held that the police practice of clandestine observation of doorless public restroom stalls
was a "search" and violated the defendant's reasonable expectation of privacy. Id. at 891, 506
P.2d at 236, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 412. The court stated that "[t]he expectation of privacy a person
has when he enters a restroom is reasonable and is not diminished or destroyed because the
toilet stall being used lacked a door." Id.
217. Id. at 893, 506 P.2d at 238, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 414.
218. Gerstein, California's Constitutional Right to Privacy: The Development of the Protec-
tion of Private Life, 9 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 385 (1982).
219. See id. at 416-17.
220. Id. at 417.
221. 21 Cal. 3d 284, 578 P.2d 123, 145 Cal. Rptr. 876 (1978).
222. Gerstein, supra note 218, at 417 & n.196 (citing Scott, 21 Cal. 3d at 294, 578 P.2d at
128, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 881).
223. Scott, 21 Cal. 3d at 294, 578 P.2d at 128, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 881.
224. Id.
225. 119 Cal. App. 3d 534, 174 Cal. Rptr. 148 (1981).
226. Id. at 549, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 157.
227. Id.
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falls squarely within the protected ambit, the expressed objectives of arti-
cle I, section 1.
"228
These cases indicate the value California courts place on the right to
privacy where bodily integrity is at issue. Courts have not yet expressly
dealt with urinalysis under California's constitution. However, it is not
difficult to assume that urinalysis is an intrusion that requires an espe-
cially strong justification because it involves intimate bodily functions,
traditionally and universally regarded as private.229
Some state constitutions differ from the federal constitution in that
they offer protection from intrusions by private parties, as well as the
government.230 The California Constitution differs in this respect.231
Although White dealt with an individual's right to privacy against
government invasion, it clearly referred to protection against business, as
well.232 A year after White, California took the next step in Porten v.
University of San Francisco,233 where the court of appeal decided a suit
against a private business on the basis of a violation of the right to pri-
vacy under the California Constitution.234 Porten involved a university
that promised to keep plaintiff's grades confidential but allegedly dis-
closed the grades to the State Scholarship and Loan Association.235 The
Porten court explained that California's constitutional provision is self-
executing; hence, it confers a judicial right of action on all Californi-
ans.136 Porten is a landmark decision because it applied the rationale
from the right to privacy ballot argument, that "[p]rivacy is protected
not merely against state action; it is considered an inalienable right which
may not be violated by anyone. '2 37 The Porten court also noted that the
ballot-argument referred to "'effective restraints on the information activ-
ities of government and business.' ,,238
Since Porten, California courts have consistently held that a person
has a cause of action against anyone-not just the government-who in-
228. Id. (emphasis added).
229. See infra text accompanying note 297.
230. Bamburger, Boosting Your Case with Your State Constitution, A.B.A. J., Mar. 1, 1986,
at 49, 50.
231. See infra notes 131-42 and accompanying text.
232. See White, 13 Cal. 3d at 774, 533 P.2d at 233, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 105.
233. 64 Cal. App. 3d 825, 134 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1976).
234. Id.
235. Id. at 827, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 840.
236. Id. at 829, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 842 (citing White, 13 Cal. 3d at 775, 533 P.2d at 234, 120
Cal. Rptr. at 106).
237. Id. (citing CALIFORNIA VOTER PAMPHLET, supra note 201, at 27) (emphasis added).
238. Id. at 829 n.2, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 842 n.2 (quoting CALIFORNIA VOTER PAMPHLET,
supra note 201, at 26 (emphasis in original)).
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vades his or her privacy.23 9 In Chico Feminist Women's Health Center v.
Butte Glenn Medical Society,24° the court stated that California's right to
privacy provides a sweeping protection against interference with all per-
sonal privacy rights and emphasized that such privacy rights included
protection against actions by private parties.2 4 1
In a recent case, Rulon-Miller v. IBM,242 a California court found
that a private business, IBM, violated an employee's reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy when it terminated her for activity unrelated to her job.243
The court in Rulon-Miller found the violation so atrocious that the jury
award of $100,000 in compensatory damages and $200,000 in punitive
damages was upheld.
2 1
V. PROPOSAL: DEFINING THE LIMITS THE CALIFORNIA
CONSTITUTION PUTS ON PRIVATE EMPLOYERS REQUIRING
EMPLOYEE URINALYSIS
A. Balancing the Interests
Similar to the fourth amendment of the United States Constitution,
California's constitutional right to privacy requires a balancing test to
determine when an individual's privacy interest is outweighed by a com-
pelling state interest.24 While the federal courts have addressed this is-
sue under the United States Constitution, the California constitutional
privacy implications of employee drug testing have not yet been ad-
dressed.24 6 This Comment uses the fourth amendment case law, as de-
fined earlier,2 47 to help define when a private employer in California may
constitutionally demand a urine test from an employee.
239. See Chico Feminist Women's Health Center v. Butte Glenn Medical Soc'y, 557 F.
Supp. 1190 (E.D. Cal. 1983) (applying California law). See also Kinsey v. Macur, 107 Cal.
App. 3d 265, 272, 165 Cal. Rptr. 608, 612 (1980) (action against private party for violating
another's constitutional right to privacy).
240. 557 F. Supp. 1190 (E.D. Cal. 1983) (applying California law).
241. Id. at 1203.
242. 162 Cal. App. 3d 241, 208 Cal. Rptr. 524 (1984).
243. Id. (plaintiff dismissed for romantic involvement with manager of rival firm). See infra
notes 273-74 and accompanying text for discussion of Rulon-Miller.
244. Rulon-Miller, 162 Cal. App. 3d at 255, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 534.
245. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966); White v. Davis, 13 Cal. 3d 757, 533
P.2d 222, 120 Cal. Rptr. 94 (1975). An early commentator specifically suggested that Califor-
nia use the fourth amendment of the United States Constitution to define when there is a state
privacy interest under the California Constitution. Fleming, supra note 194, at 363-66.
246. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
247. See generally supra notes 79-192.
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1. The employee's interest
Urine testing must initially be deemed a "privacy issue" and in-
cluded among the areas California already recognizes as warranting a
right to privacy analysis. As federal case law2 48 and common sense indi-
cate, compelled urinalysis constitutes a substantial intrusion into a per-
son's right to privacy. There is usually nothing more private to a person
than his or her own body and the physiological information it holds.
This expectation of privacy applies with equal force to all individuals,
including private employees. California law recognizes that procedures
involving "intimate. . . bodily functions, traditionally and universally
regarded as private," require especially strong justification.249 Thus, by
analogy, it is not difficult to conclude that urinalysis is an area where
private employees have a substantial personal privacy interest-an inter-
est that deserves constitutional protection under the California
Constitution.
2. The employer's interest
Once the privacy interest is acknowledged, the next issue is deter-
mining when a private employer may override an employee's privacy in-
terest by requiring a drug test. The California Constitution protects a
person's right to privacy from intrusions by government and business
unless a compelling public interest demands otherwise.250 In addition,
the means to achieve the compelling interest must be necessary and nar-
rowly tailored.25 California courts thus far have given a broad, practical
reading to this right.252 California statutory law currently prohibits a
private employer from requiring another "test," the polygraph, that simi-
larly intrudes substantially on an employee's private life.2 3
248. See generally supra notes 79-191 and accompanying text.
249. People v. Scott, 21 Cal. 3d 284, 294, 578 P.2d 123, 128, 145 Cal. Rptr. 876, 881 (1978).
See also supra notes 216-17 and accompanying text for further discussion of Scott and other
California cases recognizing bodily invasions as especially intrusive.
250. See supra text accompanying note 204.
251. See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
252. See supra notes 210-28 and accompanying text.
253. Private employers in California are prohibited by statute from using polygraph tests.
CAL. LAB. CODE § 432.2 (West 1971 & West Supp. 1986). Polygraph tests are similar to drug
tests by urinalysis in two respects. First, the purpose of both tests is to find out information
about the employee or prospective employee which might indicate undesirable traits, such as
drug use. Second, both tests are unreliable.
Critics of the use of the polygraph for truth verification in employment have recognized
the intrusiveness into workers' lives, and that these tests can be dehumanizing. Gardner, Wire-
tapping the Mind: A Call to Regulate Truth Verification in Employment, 21 SAN DIEGO L.
RaV. 295, 305-06 (1983-84) (citing Hermann, Privacy, the Prospective Employee, and Employ-
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Employers certainly have an interest in job productivity and
safety.254 However, for drug testing to be constitutionally permissible,
the employer's interest must be compelling. When the privacy interest
involves the employee's body or bodily functions, as with urinalysis, the
compelling interest requirement is heightened. In such a case, the Cali-
fornia Constitution requires that the employer have an "especially
strong" justification for invading the employee's privacy.' This is simi-
lar to the heightened standard that the federal constitution gives to intru-
sions beyond the body's surface, as enunciated in Schmerber v.
California."6  The Schmerber Court compared searches beyond the
body's surface to traditional searches, such as searches of clothing or pos-
sessions, and found the former type of search more intrusive.2 57 Federal
courts have explicitly held that urine testing is an intrusion beyond the
body's surface.25 '
a. what is a legitimate employer interest?
This Comment proposes that one way to determine whether urinal-
ysis effectuates a compelling interest is to first define the scope of an em-
ployer's legitimate interest. It is widely recognized that an employer's
legitimate interest extends only to employee conduct that affects his or
her job.2 59 Any intrusion into an employee's personal life is in itself a
violation of the employee's constitutional right to privacy when his or
her job is not affected. 60
For example, the arbitrator 2 61 in Texas Utilities Generating Co.
262
narrowly interpreted the rule prohibiting drug use on company prop-
erty263 to find for the employee. The arbitrator found that although the
ment Testing: The Need to Restrict Polygraph and Personality Testing, 47 WASH. L. REv. 73,
130, 153-54 (1971)).
254. See supra note 5 and accompanying text; see also supra note 99 and accompanying text.
255. See supra text accompanying note 249.
256. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
257. Id. at 769-70. See also supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text.
258. See supra notes 91-104 and accompanying text.
259. See infra notes 261-81.
260. A recent San Francisco Municipal Code was passed directly supporting this premise.
See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
261. Although arbitration cases are not precedent for California or federal courts, they are
very helpful. Arbitration in a labor context occurs when there is an employer-employee dis-
pute over a collective bargaining agreement. The arbitrator steps in mainly to determine
whether the contract was followed. See generally Bornstein, Drug and Alcohol Issues in the
Workplace: An Arbitrator's Perspective, 39 ARB. J., Sept. 1984, at 19; Wynns, Arbitration Stan-
dards in Drug Discharge Cases, 34 ARB. J., June 1979, at 19.
262. 82 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 6 (Nov. 30, 1983) (Edes, Arb.).
263. Id. at 11.
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employee was driving on company premises when drugs were found, he
was not driving in the capacity of an employee-the employee was not on
his way to work, was not on working hours, and his presence on the
property was unrelated to his employment. 264 Because the employee was
not acting "in the capacity of an employee," the arbitrator held that the
company representatives had no right to require him to submit to drug
testing.265 The arbitrator added that under these circumstances, the em-
ployer had no more right to make the employee submit to drug testing
than if he was found smoking marijuana away from the company on his
own time.26 6 This case indicates that an employer's legitimate concern
regarding employee drug use does not extend to use away from work.
Some arbitrators hold that the illegality of drug use is not a legiti-
mate concern of business.26 7 The concern should be the effect on work.
For example, both drugs and alcohol have a similarly debilitating effect
on employees and both cause the same basic safety concerns.268 Thus,
although alcohol and drug use are technically different, the company's
interest in controlling them is the same. This approach was adopted in
the arbitration case of Mallinckrodt, Inc.,269 where employees were ter-
minated because they were found smoking "a single joint" during a
break. The arbitrator held that the termination was improper for two
reasons. First, the arbitrator found that this drug use did not threaten
harm to employees, to others or to property.270 Second, the arbitrator
found too much disparity between the company's treatment of alcohol
and drug users.27 1 The arbitrator emphasized the similar effect on work




267. These arbitrators ruled that employers are not justified in treating drug users more
harshly than they do alcohol users. See Susser, Legal Issues Raised by Drugs in the Workplace,
36 LAB. L.J. 42, 43-45 (1985).
268. Mallinckrodt, Inc., 80 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1261, 1265 (May 15, 1983) (Seidman, Arb.).
See also Susser, supra note 267, at 45.
269. 80 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1261 (May 15, 1983) (Seidman, Arb.).
270. Id. at 1266.
271. The arbitrator stated that "alcoholism is still the Nation's #1 drug problem. . . . If
the case is to be viewed as concerned primarily as the Company's need to protect itself against
impairment of performance at the workplace, it seems no question that alcohol is at least on
par with marijuana . . . ." Id. (discussing Umpire Decision N-69 (Valtin, Ump.) (matter
between UAW and General Motors Corp.) (citation omitted by arbitrator)). In Mallinckrodt,
employees received short disciplinary layoffs for violating the no drinking policy but were
terminated for violating the no marijuana policy. Id. at 1264-65.
272. Id. at 1266 (discussing Umpire Decision N-69 (Valtin, Ump.) (matter between UAW
and General Motors Corp.) (citation omitted by arbitrator)).
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Certain company policies also recognize that an employer has no
concern with an employee's private life. The case of Rulon-Miller v.
IBM273 provides an excellent example. IBM had a written policy which
protected a worker's right to privacy for all off-duty activity not affecting
his or her job.274 In Rulon-Miller, a California court held that IBM's
liability for invading its employee's right to privacy stemmed in part
from its own policy which expressly withdrew any company interest in
employee off-duty conduct which did not affect work. 75 Once IBM rec-
ognized its employees' right to privacy in their personal lives, it could not
then terminate employment based on those same private matters. This
case is particularly relevant because it applied the California constitu-
tional right to privacy to rebuke an employer's interference with an em-
ployee's private life.
Federal courts, when discussing urine testing, also refer to an em-
ployer's interest in the actual effect on job performance. For example, in
Allen v. City of Marietta,276 which upheld employee drug testing, the
court explicitly stated that an employer's legitimate concern is only with
drug use "directly relevant to the employee's [job] performance." '2 77 In
McDonell v. Hunter,278 where the court struck down a policy of ran-
domly testing prison employees, the court stated that urine testing would
be acceptable if there were a "reasonable suspicion, based on specific ob-
jective facts and reasonable inferences drawn from those facts . . . that
the employee is then under the influence of alcoholic beverages or con-
trolled substances. ' 279 In Shoemaker v. Handel, the court also recog-
nized the problem that urinalysis is unable to indicate actual intoxication
273. 162 Cal. App. 3d 241, 208 Cal. Rptr. 524 (1984).
274. Rulon-Miller based her claim on an IBM policy which provided in part:
We have concern with an employee's off-the-job behavior only when it reduces
his ability to perform regular job assignments, interferes with the job performance of
other employees, or if his outside behavior affects the reputation of the company in a
major way. When on-the-job performance is acceptable, I can think of few situations
in which outside activities could result in disciplinary action or dismissal.
IBM's first basic belief is respect for the individual, and the essence of this belief is
a strict regard for his right to personal privacy. This idea should never be compro-
mised easily or quickly.
Id. at 249, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 530 (quoting internal IBM memorandum written by Tom Watson,
Jr., former Chairman of IBM) (emphasis added).
275. See supra note 274 for pertinent text of IBM policy.
276. 601 F. Supp. 482 (N.D. Ga. 1985); see supra notes 117-34 and accompanying text for a
discussion of Allen.
277. Id. at 489 (emphasis added).
278. 612 F. Supp. 1122 (S.D. Iowa 1985); see supra notes 154-69 and accompanying text for
a discussion of McDonell.
279. Id. at 1130 (emphasis added).
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while at work 2 80
A recent source supporting the proposition that an employer's legiti-
mate concern is only with conduct that directly affects the employee
while on the job is the municipal ordinance enacted in San Francisco in
November 1985. This ordinance not only prohibits random drug testing
of employees, but also protects employee privacy regarding "off-the-job
conduct, associations, and activities not directly related to the actual per-
formance of job responsibilities.
2 81
This Comment adopts this view. It suggests that employees' activity
conducted on their own time is their personal concern. Under California
constitutional standards such off-work activity is not a compelling con-
cern of employers.
The question then becomes does urinalysis for drugs inform an em-
ployer that an employee was intoxicated while on the job? In other
words, is urinalysis an effective tool for carrying out a legitimate em-
ployer interest, not to mention a compelling interest? As stated earlier,
due to their inherent limitations, the urine tests cannot be designed to
determine intoxication at the time of testing.282 What they are designed
to detect is recent use.283 This means that even an accurate test that
correctly shows drug use may only be telling an employer that the em-
ployee smoked marijuana within the last month 84-- perhaps while on
vacation or over the weekend. In any event, the intoxication, which lasts
a matter of hours, 85 may no longer exist.
Since the tests do not confirm that an employee is under the influ-
ence while at work, they do not further employers' legitimate interest in
their employees' performance while at work. If the results of an em-
ployee's test are not within the scope of an employer's legitimate interest,
it follows that there can be no compelling interest in obtaining that
information.286
280. 619 F. Supp. 1089, 1104 (D.N.J. 1985); see supra notes 148-50 and accompanying text.
281. SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., POLICE CODE ch. 8, art. 33A (1985); see supra note 68 and
accompanying text for text of the ordinance.
282. See supra notes 39-45 and accompanying text.
283. See supra notes 39-45 and accompanying text.
284. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
285. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
286. Another serious problem with relying on urine tests to detect drug use is inaccuracy.
Incorrect positive readings-false positives-are considered extremely common. See supra
note 7. For example, ordinary substances, such as aspirin and herbal tea, sometimes create
false positives. See text accompanying notes 52 & 54. See generally supra notes 46-54 and
accompanying text. This is a frightening possibility when something as vital as one's job is on
the line.
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b. what is a compelling employer interest?
Like California's constitutional right to privacy, the fourth amend-
ment protects an individual's privacy interest against all but compelling
interests. All federal courts that upheld employee urinalysis emphasized
that the jobs performed were highly dangerous, such as public bus driv-
ing, 287 working with high voltage wiresz 88 and horse racing.z89 This
Comment proposes that one of the only interests, if not the only interest,
compelling enough to override an employees' right to privacy is that of
avoiding a substantial threat to the safety of employees or of the
public.290
B. Other Reasonableness Factors
The propriety of a urine test is not based solely on the compelling
interest of worker and public safety.291 Other protections are required to
ensure an individual's right to privacy is not unnecessarily or unreasona-
bly violated. Schmerber v. California29 2 and its progeny2 93 recognized
that under the United States Constitution certain reasonableness factors
must be weighed to determine the constitutionality of a compelled body
fluid test. Three of the Schmerber factors are particularly relevant to
whether a compelled urine test is reasonable: (1) the likelihood drugs
will be found; (2) the reliability of the test; and (3) the manner of
testing.
294
The likelihood that drugs will be found is of utmost importance.295
287. Division 241 Amalgamated Transit Union v. Susey, 538 F.2d 1264 (7th Cir.), cert
denied, 429 U.S. 1029 (1976); see supra text accompanying note 112.
288. Allen v. City of Marietta, 601 F. Supp. 482 (N.D. Ga. 1985); see supra text accompa-
nying note 118.
289. Shoemaker v. Handel, 619 F. Supp. 1089 (D.N.J. 1985); see supra notes 151-53 and
accompanying text.
290. See SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., POLICE CODE ch. 8, art. 33A (1985); see supra note 68.
This recently enacted municipal ordinance states that one requirement before conducting an
employee drug test is that "the employee [must be] in a position where [drug induced impair-
ment] presents a clear and present danger to the physical safety of the employee, another
employee or a member of the public. SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., POLICE CODE ch. 8, art.
33A, § 3300A.5(b) (1985).
291. See generally notes 87 & 106-93 for a discussion of the reasonableness factors recog-
nized in federal urinalysis cases.
292. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
293. See supra notes 107-90 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Schmerber prog-
eny that relate to urinalysis. See generally supra notes 79-190 for a discussion of Schmerber
and its application to federal urinalysis cases.
294. See supra notes 87, 170-76, 179-83 & 186-90 and accompanying text.
295. See generally supra text accompanying notes 171-76 for a summary of how federal
courts dealt with this factor in urinalysis cases.
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The Schmerber Court found that "searches involving intrusions beyond
the body's surface" require a "clear indication that in fact [drugs] will be
found."'2 96 The employer must actually believe that the employee is in-
toxicated before conducting a urine test. Under this standard, employers
should never require random testing.
Even where the activity is dangerous, a person should not be re-
quired to take a drug test unless there are reasonable, objective facts indi-
cating that that worker is intoxicated while on the job.2 97 Any legitimate
interest the employer has in detecting drugs affecting a person's work is
not promoted by implementing drug tests which are at best only able to
detect recent use. A proper application of this first Schmerber factor
would require evaluating the existence of reasonable objective, cor-
roborating facts that indicate employee drug use while at work. Both the
Allen v. City of Marietta2 98 court and the Division 241 Amalgamated
Transit Union v. Suscy 29 9 court discussed the objective facts leading to
the urine tests at issue. The McDonell v. Hunter 300 court also mentioned
that a finding of "reasonable suspicion, based on specific objective facts
and reasonable inferences drawn from those facts. . . that the employee
is then under the influence of . . .controlled substances" might be
acceptable.3 0'
As recognized in McDonell, a general desire for a drug-free environ-
ment-even in a prison-is not compelling enough to allow random drug
testing of employees.3 °2 If it were enough, employers might next be al-
lowed to inspect the home of an apparently law abiding employee "just in
case" drugs might be found which could be brought into the workplace,
or they might be allowed to "bug" the employee's home or telephone to
make sure that the individual is not involved in illegal activity that could
affect the employee's work or safety.
296. 384 U.S. at 769-70 (emphasis added); see supra text accompanying note 85.
297. An employer's legitimate interest is limited to activity that actually affects an em-
ployee's work. See supra notes 259-81 and accompanying text. Requiring a "great likelihood
drugs will be found" provides some protection against the problem outlined above, see supra
notes 39-45 and accompanying text, regarding the test's inability to indicate intoxication while
on the job-the only area where an employer has any legitimate interest.
298. 601 F. Supp. 482 (N.D. Ga. 1985); see supra text accompanying note 119.
299. 538 F.2d 1264 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1029 (1976); see supra text accompany-
ing note 115.
300. 612 F. Supp. 1122 (S.D. Iowa 1985).
301. McDonell, 612 F. Supp. at 1130.
302. Id. at 1130. See also People v. Triggs, 8 Cal. 3d 884, 892, 506 P.2d 232, 237, 106 Cal.
Rptr. 408, 413 (1973), where the California Supreme Court recognized that both the United
States and California Constitutions make it "emphatically clear" that the right to privacy must




In order for an employer to be able to admininster a mandatory
drug test, there must at least be good reason to believe that the employee
is intoxicated at work. An employer can take many steps less intrusive
than random drug testing to ensure safety.30 3 As recognized in McDon-
ell, careful screening of job applicants is one legitimate way for employ-
ers to protect this interest.
The second relevant Schmerber factor focuses on the test's reliabil-
ity. Urinalysis for drugs is severely criticized for its inaccuracy.3 4 One
reason is that the tests can detect substances such as herbal tea and aspi-
rin and mistake them for drugs.30 5 Also, improper handling by non-tech-
nical personnel causes inaccurate results.30 6 Another problem arises
because a non-smoker's test can show positive merely because he or she
passively inhaled the marijuana smoke of another.3 7 At minimum, to
satisfy the reliability factor, a confirmation test should always be insti-
tuted after a positive urinalysis.30 8
Finally, the third factor-the manner of testing-should -also be
carefully scrutinized when determining whether a person's privacy has
been unreasonably invaded. This is necessary to prevent errors in testing
procedure as well as to decrease the possibility of humiliation and harass-
ment of the employee. Examples of what constitutes a reasonable man-
ner include: testing conducted in a hospital by trained personnel,30 9
confirmation of a positive test by an alternate means,310 the right to ap-
peal the finding,3 1' the right to face any witnesses 312 and documented
evidence of why the employee was suspected of drug use.313 Without
these standards to protect employees, employers have too great an oppor-
tunity to harass employees 314 and to intrude into the employee's private
303. The California Constitution requires that the compelling interest be achieved by the
least intrusive means. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1. See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
304. See generally supra note 7.
305. See supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
306. See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
307. See text accompanying notes 47-48.
308. See supra notes 58-62 and accompanying text.
309. See supra text accompanying note 190.
310. See supra notes 58-62 and accompanying text discussing the necessity of a confirma-
tion test, especially when something significant, such as a job, is at stake.
311. See supra text accompanying notes 120-2 1.
312. See supra text accompanying note 121.
313. See supra text accompanying notes 115 & 119.
314. Gary Williams, ACLU Worker's Rights Attorney, commented that several incidents
have come to his attention where employers use urine testing for an improper purpose. For
example, more than one union representative told him that certain companies with two-tier
pay scales will test older long term employees for drugs. The tests are used as a mechanism to
rid the company of higher paid employees so new lower paid employees can be hired. Mr.
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C. Is Testing the Least Restrictive Means of Achieving an
Employer's Goal?
The California Constitution requires that justified intrusions utilize
the least intrusive method available to further the "compelling inter-
est." '315 Therefore, even ifa compelling interest can be established, under
this requirement drug testing generally should not be allowed. Presuma-
bly, if an employer has the objective facts which this Comment suggests
are needed for a constitutional urine test, that information alone would
constitute grounds to terminate, discipline or provide drug counseling316
for the employee-even without the test. A person's outward inability to
safely and properly fulfill his or her employment obligation alone should
be grounds for employer action without conducting the drug test. If an
employee is not fulfilling his or her employment obligations because of an
inability to perform-for drug-related or other reasons-the employer
should be able to take action based on that information alone.
VI. CONCLUSION
Combatting drug abuse in the workplace is a noble goal. However,
the California Constitution requires that any invasion of privacy by gov-
ernment or businesss entities be necessary to achieve a compelling inter-
est. Dealing with employee drug use by requiring all employees-
innocent as well as guilty, suspected as well as not suspected, janitors as
well as nuclear power plant employees-to submit to drug urinalysis
sweeps too broadly.
Individuals need judicial protection from both government and busi-
ness entities. Both entities are able to exert peculiar and forceful control
over individuals. This control can leave those individuals vulnerable to
unreasonable, unnecessary and humiliating affronts to their personal dig-
nity and sovereignty. Mandatory urinalysis has the potential to cause
Williams found that singling out older employees for testing was particularly odd because
younger persons are usually considered more likely to use drugs. Telephone interview with
Gary Williams, Southern California ACLU (Mar. 31, 1986). See Storms v. Coughlin, 600 F.
Supp. 1214, 1223 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
315. See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
316. If a company wants to promote a drug-free environment, it can provide lectures and
other information as well as treatment for employees who voluntarily admit to a problem or
who, confronted with a problem, consent to be treated. For example, Commonwealth Edison
Co. provided its employees with a "comprehensive awareness" program giving health and
safety information on drugs. See Bensinger, Drugs in the Workplace, HARV. Bus. REV., Nov.-
Dec. 1982, at 48, 49.
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such an affront. Without judicial protection, government entities can
force a person to submit to an unreasonable search by threatening fines
or jail. Similarly, an employer can invade an employee's constitutional
right to privacy by threatening termination-"your urine or your job."
More often than not, in such a circumstance, an employee is not in the
position to protect his or her own privacy right. When an employee
faced with mandated urinalysis comes to the court seeking protection
under the California Constitution, the court must fulfill its duty to pre-
vent unwarranted invasions of privacy.
Compelled employee drug testing by urinalysis is only constitutional
when (1) there is a clear and substantial threat to safety, (2) it is clear
that the employee is impaired while on the job, and (3) procedural safe-
guards are provided so that the employee is not unduly harrassed or in-
correctly pegged as a drug user.
The fundamental right to privacy is more than a legal term of art to
a person who is asked to urinate in a bottle--often in front of another
person to ensure reliability. For some it is easy to rationalize a privacy
violation when it affects someone else, but for the person tested, urinal-
ysis can be a degrading and embarrasing invasion of privacy.317 It is not
constitutional, nor is it fair, to condition employment on a test that sub-
stantially intrudes on privacy and is so often inaccurate.
Patricia A. Hunter*
317. A recent case involving Rodney Smith, deputy executive director of the President's
Commission on Organized Crime illustrates this point. Mr. Smith was told that he himself
would be required to provide a urine sample before testifying as to why urinalysis should be
required for all federal employees. He was told by the Chairman of the House Post Office and
Civil Service human resources subcommittee to "go to the men's room under the direct obser-
vation of a male member of the subcommittee staff to urinate in [a] specimen bottle." Drug
Test Advocate Refuses to be Tested, L.A. Times, Mar. 19, 1986, pt. I, at 10, col. 1 (quoting
Gary L. Ackerman). He was then handed the bottle. Smith refused to comply and later an-
grily complained that he was not warned and that the subcommittee embarrassed him before
television cameras. Id. at 10, col. 2. It was pointed out that under the presidential commis-
sion's proposal, federal workers would also have no warning before the administration of a
mandatory urine test. Id. Smith complained that the hearings were "'serious matters,'" and
that Congress had no right to demand drug tests without probable cause or reasonable suspi-
cion that the test was needed. Id. at 10, col. 3.
The embarrassment and humiliation caused by urinalysis was recently recognized in the
student drug testing context. Englade, supra note 4, at 26. The court found that " '[r]equiring
teenage students to disrobe from the waist down while an adult official . . . watches the stu-
dent urinate in the open into a tube is an excessive intrusion of a student's legitimate expecta-
tion of privacy.'" Id. (citations omitted).
* The author wishes to thank Gary Williams, Ellen Greenstone and Norm Beal for the
suggestions, information and support they contributed to this Comment.
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